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ABSTRACT

Running critical applications, such as e-commerce, in a distributed environment requires assurance
of the identities of the participants communicating with each other. Providing such assurance in
a distributed environment is a difficult task. The goal of a security protocol is to overcome the
vulnerabilities of a distributed environment by providing a secure way to disseminate critical information into the network. However, designing a security protocol is itself an error-prone process.
In addition to employing an authentication protocol, one also needs to make sure that the protocol
successfully achieves its authentication goals.
The Distributed Temporal Protocol Logic (DTPL) provides a language for formalizing both
local and global properties of distributed communicating processes. The DTPL can be effectively
applied to security protocol analysis as a model checker. Although, a model checker can determine
flaws in a security protocol, it can not provide proof of the security properties of a protocol. In this
research, we extend the DTPL language and construct a set of axioms by transforming the unified
framework of SVO logic into DTPL. This results into a deductive style proof-based framework
for the verification of authentication protocols. The proposed framework represents authentication
protocols and concisely proves their security properties. We formalize various features essential
for achieving authentication, such as message freshness, key association, and source association
in our framework. Since analyzing security protocols greatly depends upon associating a received
message to its source, we separately analyze the source association axioms, translate them into our
framework, and extend the idea for public-key protocols. Developing a proof-based framework
in temporal logic gives us another verification tool in addition to the existing model checker. A
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security property of a protocol can either be verified using our approach, or a design flaw can be
identified using the model checker. In this way, we can analyze a security protocol from both
perspectives while benefiting from the representation of distributed temporal protocol logic.
A challenge-response strategy provides a higher level of abstraction for authentication protocols. Here, we also develop a set of formulae using the challenge-response strategy to analyze a
protocol at an abstract level. This abstraction has been adapted from the authentication tests of
the graph-theoretic approach of strand space method. First, we represent a protocol in logic and
then use the challenge-response strategy to develop authentication tests. These tests help us find
the possibility of attacks on authentication protocols by investigating the originator of its received
messages. Identifying the unintended originator of a received message indicates the existence of
possible flaws in a protocol. We have applied our strategy on several well-known protocols and
have successfully identified the attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Distributed systems have been in use for commercial purposes as well as in sensitive domains, such
as defense, for many years. E-commerce has also become a widely used successful tool to promote
businesses on the internet. In scenarios where critical information is being widely communicated
across distributed networks, security becomes an extremely important issue. Before initiating a
financial transaction, one needs to make sure that its sensitive data will be securely transmitted to
the intended recipient. Several types of encryption schemes have been developed to ensure secure
transmission of data. However, history has shown that even assuming ideal cryptography1 , one can
not assure that its secrets will safely reach to the intended destination. The reason for this lack of
security is not the underlying cryptography, but the security holes in the cryptographic protocols
themselves.
A security protocol (or cryptographic protocol) is a sequence of messages between two or more
parties in which encryption is used to provide authentication or to distribute cryptographic keys for
new conversations [NS78]. The network is assumed to be hostile as it contains intruders with the
capabilities to encrypt, decrypt, copy, forward, delete, and so forth. Considering an active intruder
with such powerful capabilities, it becomes extremely difficult to guarantee proper working of a
security protocol. Several examples show how carefully designed protocols were later found out to
have security breaches [MFG06b]. This situation led the researchers to formalize the verification
of security protocols.
1

Ideal cryptography means that a principal must have a key in order to perform any cryptographic operation (such
as encryption, decryption, signatures) using that key.

1

Logic-based verification is one of the widely used formal verification techniques in the domain of security protocols. This is due to both, the simplicity of the logic-based methods and
the conciseness of the proof they generate [CDF03]. The logic of belief of [BAN90], known as
BAN logic, provided the initial impetus in applying modal logic in a proof-based environment.
Analyzing a protocol in BAN begins by first formalizing the message exchanges of the protocol
in the language of its logic. Then all the initial assumptions of the protocol and assertions about
each message exchange are written. Finally, BAN rules are applied on the assumptions and the
assertions in order to derive the conclusion. Although BAN logic has also been criticized for various reasons explained in the next section, it has been successfully used to discover various attacks
on well-known protocols. With the emergence of BAN, several researchers have applied various
logic-based techniques for the formal verification of security protocols. BAN logic has also been
extended in many ways [GNY90, Oor93, SV93, AT91].
Recently a new logic, called distributed temporal protocol logic (DTPL), has been proposed in
[CVB05a] which provides an object-level tool to model distributed communication. DTPL’s distinguishing characteristics is its capability to be used as a metalevel tool for comparative analysis
of security protocol models and properties. In this thesis, we have developed a BAN-like proof
system based on distributed temporal protocol logic. We devise a logic-based verification system
that involves the notion of derivability (i.e. proofs) in which a formula ϕ is derivable from a set of
formulae Γ using the inference rules. Since DTPL provides an intuitive framework that captures
reasoning in a distributed environment, we utilize the existing DTPL and develop it such that it
can be used to verify security protocols in a proof-based setting. For this purpose, we take advantage from the work of [SC01] (SVO logic). The reason for using SVO is that it clarifies many
2

concepts in previous logics and unifies four of its predecessors in a sound way. We demonstrate
how DTPL incorporates the essential features for protocol verification of SVO in its framework.
We also describe how DTPL helps us clarify some concepts, such as freshness, in the existing
logic-based techniques. As in other logic-based techniques, we see security protocols to possess
essential ingredients to guarantee authentication, such as message freshness, key association, message origination etc. We represent these ingredients in terms of DTPL. Authentication protocols
can be broadly categorized based on different types of cryptography they use and on how they
achieve authentication goal. In particular, when finding the originator of a received message, we
categorize authentication protocols into symmetric-key, asymmetric-key, and challenge-response
protocols.
Our verification framework contains the advantages of both, the expressibility of the existing
DTPL model as well as the conciseness of a proof-based system. Moreover, due to DTPL’s rich
interpretation structure of Winskel [Win87], analyzing a protocol becomes clearer as compared to
other logic-based techniques. Since our work is based on the notion of derivability, the verification
process does not explicitly model an intruder, thereby obviating the need to apply all combinations
of intruder behaviors for protocol analysis. This results in considerable simplicity in the way a
proof-based method analyzes a protocol. In addition to developing the existing DTPL framework
for three types of protocols, we demonstrate the applicability of our work by applying it on wellknown protocols.
We have also used the distributed temporal protocol logic in order to analyze security protocol
at a higher level of abstraction. In particular, we analyze a protocol by first representing the run
of each participant of the protocol in terms of its corresponding life-cycle. Next, we try to achieve
3

match in the parameters among the participants of a protocol. Authentication is achieved if critical
parameters of a participant matches with the parameters of the rest of the participants of a protocol.
In the effort to find the matching parameters, each participant investigates its own life-cycle and
tries to find out the originators of each of its received messages. More specifically, each participant
initiates a challenge and waits for the response of that challenge in order to assure the identity of
the originator of its received messages. We use this challenge-response criterion to develop simple
tests like the one developed in another framework of [GF02]. Given these tests, one can determine the identity of the originator of the response of a challenge generated by a participant. A
protocol fails to achieve authentication either if we find a mismatch in the parameters among the
participants, or if we find an unintended originator of a received message at any participant’s local life-cycle. The resulting verification strategy not only contains the expressibility of the existing
DTPL model but it also provides a concise tool that can be used as a heuristic to investigate authentication protocols. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our work, we analyze a well-known
protocol using our method and compare it with the existing DTPL model.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes a brief survey of efforts
in the field of formal verification of cryptographic protocols. Chapter 3 discusses the notion of a
secure system and the issues related to it. In particular, we discuss authentication protocols, their
properties, and the design goals that should be focused on in order to achieve a secure system. We
discuss our proposed scheme in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we first present a brief introduction of
the Distributed Temporal Protocol Logic. Then we describe how this logic can be used to develop
a proof-based verification framework. Next, we apply our proposed framework on well-known
protocols in Chapter 5. More specifically, we apply the proposed framework on the Needham4

Schroeder Secret-Key and the PKINIT protocols. Finally, we extend our framework in order to
derive a higher level authentication tool in Chapter 6. The conclusion is followed in Chapter 7.

5

CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK

Probably the authors Needham and Shroeder in [NS78] were the first to mention the need for
techniques to formally verify the correctness of security protocols. Formal methods are useful for
the analysis of security protocols. They allow one both to do a thorough analysis of the different
paths which an intruder can take, and to specify precisely the environmental assumptions that have
been made [Mea03].
Formal verification of system properties relies on having a complete description of the system
under consideration. For security protocols, this implies modeling of both the communicating
parties and the potential penetrator. A cryptographic protocol is required to achieve its goals in
the presence of saboteur. Designers should foresee all the possible attacks on the protocol under
development. Formalism has been applied to a wide range of cryptographic protocols in order to
verify security properties.
All formalism based strategies begin by expressing the cryptographic protocol in a formal notation or model and then proving that the expressed model achieves its security goals. The verification process can be distinguished in two major categories, theorem proving and model checking.
In the first method, logic is used along with formal proof. Mathematical proof is considered as the
strongest argument to guarantee the correctness of a system. This method is build upon traditional
mathematical reasoning. Existing logical notations are utilized with the addition of new notations
to express the formal model into logic. Theorem proving techniques are applied on the resulting
model to prove its correctness. These proofs are complex, challenging, and require the presence of
mathematical experts.
6

Once a formal model of a system has been established, model checking can be utilized to
establish the accuracy of the system. Model checking is an alternative resort to theorem proving.
A model checker is a tool that explores the state space of the model to determine if there are any
paths through the space that corresponds to a successful attack. There have been several attempts
to model checking for security protocol verification. Almost all approaches use similar penetrator
model. The main difference is in the ways one specifies a protocol and its properties, and how a
particular model checker performs the analysis. Below we summarize the work that has been done
in the field of formal verification of cryptographic protocols.

2.1 Dolev-Yao Model
The significant early work on formal verification of cryptographic protocols is contributed to Dolev
and Yao [DY83]. This work pioneered in modeling a penetrator and defining its abilities such as
encryption and decryption(by some keys a penetrator possesses), message forwarding, copying,
deleting and so on. Since then, virtually all formal verification techniques use the same penetrator
model.
The work was mainly focused for the protocols that transmit a secret plaintext M between two
users. So the secrecy property was the primary target instead of the authentication property even
though they are closely linked with each other. Three example protocols were mentioned in order
to clarify how to achieve security in a protocol. Moreover, it was stressed that adding additional
layers of encryption did not necessarily increase the security of a protocol. Rather, sometimes it is
detrimental to the very purpose of the design. The authors presented precise mathematical models
for two classes of protocols named “the cascade protocols” and “the name-stamp protocols”. The
7

cascade protocols contain encryption and decryption as the only operations performed on messages whereas the name stamp protocols allow users to append, delete and check names encrypted
together with the plaintext.
The authors suggest the following two conditions to be necessary in order to assure the security
of cascade protocols:
1. The messages transmitted between two participants must contain some layers of encryption
functions.
2. In generating a reply message, each participant A never applies decryption function DA without also applying encryption function E A .
Similarly, for a two party name stamp protocol T , the authors define that T is insecure if a string
γ ∈ V ∗ Ni (X, Y) exists such that γ = λ. Here V is the string of operators that an intruder can apply
on any message and Ni (X, Y) is the sequence of texts transmitted between X and Y, when X wishes
to send plaintext M to Y. Otherwise T is defined to be secure. Consider the following two party
name stamp protocol:

1. X → Y : (X, Ey (Ey (M)X), Y)
2. Y → X : (Y, E x (E x (M)Y), X)

The authors have proven this protocol to be flawed. For the above mentioned protocol, the sequence of operators applied by participant X in the first message = N1 (X, Y) = EY iX EY . That
is, the participant X first applies encryption EY (using Y’s public key) on message M, then appends his own id X (append operation iX ), and finalizes the message by applying the encryp8

tion operation EY again. Similarly, in the second message the participant Y applies the operators N2 (X, Y) = E X iY E X . The authors also defined additional operators such as d for deleting an id from a string, dX for deleting a known id X from a string, and DX for the decryption
using X’s private key. The attack on this protocol exists as the authors found the string γ =
DZ dDZ EZ iX EZ DX dZ DX E X iZ dDZ dDZ EZ iX EZ DX dZ DX E X iZ N2 (X, Y) ∈ V ∗ Ni (X, Y) such that γ = λ.
γ simply represents the sequence of operators a saboteur applies on a protocol message resulting
into a null string. In this way, a saboteur can obtain the secret plaintext from an encrypted message.

2.2 The Logic of BAN
BAN [BAN90] is a logic of belief which was the first attempt in applying modal logic to verify
security protocols. Since security protocols involve principals sending and receiving messages to
each other, each principal holds certain beliefs about these messages. For example, a principal A
believes that a message M is fresh. In BAN notations, it is represented by A |≡ #(M). Since the notations used in BAN are non-intuitive, we replace those notations by their meaning in plain English
as done in [AT91] and [SC01]. Therefore, we replace A |≡ #(M) by A believes f resh(M). Principals also hold beliefs about communication, such as A believes B said M, A believes B sees M
and so on. Some of the other expressions of the language of BAN are A controls M (A is trusted
k

k

on the values of M), A ←→ B (k is a shared key between A and B), and 7→ A (k is a public-key of
A). BAN analyzes a protocol by following a sequence of steps and applying a set of rules. We will
explain these steps with the help of an example in this section. Some of the important BAN rules
include:
Message Meaning Rule: This rule states that if A believes k to be a shared-secret between him
9

and B and he received a message encrypted by k, then he is entitled to believe that B said M. This
rule is used to find out the sender of a received message such that some principals already share
some secrets.
k

A believes A ←→ B
A received{M}k
A believes B said M
Public-key equivalent of this rule can also be written in the similar way.

Nonce Verification Rule: It states that if A believes a message M to be fresh and he believes
that a principal B said that message sometime in the past, then he is entitled to believe that B still
believes in M (because of its freshness). This rule is used to make sure that principals do not
become victim of replay attack in which an intruder replays an old message.

A believes f resh(M)
A believes B said M
A believes B believes M

Jurisdiction Rule: It states that if a principal believes in a message M such that he has authority
over M then M is believable. It is mainly used for servers who are responsible for generating keys
for other principals.

A believes B controls M
A believes B believes M
A believes M

The above-mentioned rules provide the main machinery in achieving security goals, such as
authentication, in BAN logic. To facilitate the goal derivation, BAN also provides some other rules
as given below.
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A believes the concatenation and concatenates of its believed messages1 :

A believes X A believes Y
A believes (X, Y)

A believes (X, Y)
A believes X

A believes that the other principals believe in the concatenates of their concatenated messages:

A believes B believes(X, Y)
A believes B believes X

A holds B responsible for saying all the concatenates of a said message:

A believes B said(X, Y)
A believes B said X

A message is fresh if any of its concatenates is fresh:

A believes f resh(X)
A believes f resh(X, Y)

Given that a principal holds the corresponding decryption key, contents of an encrypted received
message are also considered to be received:
k

A believes A ←→ B
A received{M}k
A received M
1

In BAN, a comma is used to represent concatenation of two messages X and Y, i.e. X, Y.
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The above rule can also be extended for public-key encryption and public-key signature as follows:
k

k

A believes(7→ A) A received{M}k
A received M

A believes(7→ B) A received{M}k−1
A received M

Here, k represents a public key whereas k−1 represents a private key in asymmetric cryptography.
In symmetric cryptography, k = k−1 . Concatenates of a concatenated received message are also
believed to be received:
A received(X, Y)
A received X
Given the above rules, BAN logic analyzes a protocol using the following steps.
1) Idealize a protocol (explained by the following example).
2) State all the initial assumptions of the protocol.
3) For each message transmission in the protocol of the form A → B : M, write assertion of
the form B received M.
4) Apply BAN rules on the assumptions and assertions to derive beliefs held by other principals
of the protocol.

We use a very simple protocol to demonstrate the application of BAN logic. The “WideMouthed Frog protocol” has been analyzed using BAN in [BAN90]. The protocol comprises of
only two steps as shown in Fig. 2.1. In the first message, a principal A sends a session key kAB
along with a timestamp T a to S . After checking the timeliness of the first message, S adds its own
timestamp and sends the second message to B.
Step 1: The idealized protocol is given below.
12

A

S

B

A, {Ta , B, kAB }kAS
{Ts , A, kAB }kBS
Figure 2.1: The Wide-Mouthed Frog Protocol
kAB

Message 1. A → S : {T a , (A ←→ B)}kAS
kAB

Message 2. S → B : {T s , A believes(A ←→ B)}kBS
Notice that the idealization step not only requires the understanding of the working of the protocol,
but it also demands announcing the corresponding beliefs of a principal at the time of sending its
kAB

messages. As in the above, the first message is idealized such that A ←→ B (A’s belief about
kAB ) replaces B, kAB . Similarly, second message attaches the S ’s belief about kAB . Also note that
plaintext messages (A in the first message) are not part of the idealization.
Step 2: The initial assumptions are stated as follows. [BAN90] calls some of the assumptions as
dubious as explained in Step 4.
kAS

kBS

A believes A ←→ S

B believes B ←→ S

kAS

kBS

S believes A ←→ S

S believes B ←→ S

S believes f resh(T a )

B believes f resh(T s )
k

B believes A controls A ←→ B
k

B believes(S controls(A believes A ←→ B))
Step 3: Assertions can be easily written using step 1 as follows.
kAB

S received {T a , (A ←→ B)}kAS
kAB

B received {T s , A believes(A ←→ B)}kBS
Step 4: Now the protocol analysis is almost trivial as we simply need to apply the BAN rules using
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the assumptions and the assertions stated above. We omit the detailed derivation steps and write
the conclusion as follows.
kAB

S believes A believes A ←→ B
kAB

A believes A ←→ B
kAB

B believes A ←→ B
kAB

B believes A believes A ←→ B
Observe that the above derivation became possible when we used some strange assumptions in
kAB

step 2. The most dubious assumption is that B believes A to generate good keys in B believes A ←→
B as also mentioned in [BAN90]. The authors in [BAN90] claim a protocol to be secure in BAN
logic only if it abides by the assumptions taken during the analysis. That is why, the use of this
protocol is restricted to only those scenarios where A represents a trusted and competent authority
on generating good session keys.
So far, we have presented a brief account on the logic of belief and its application. Now we
present some of the extensions of BAN logic.

2.3 BAN Extensions
With the emergence of BAN, researchers have suddenly realized the potential of applying logicbased techniques for the formal verification of authentication protocols. Even though BAN has
successfully identified flaws in some well-known protocols [BAN90], it has been rigorously analyzed for potential weaknesses and several corrective measures have been suggested. The immediate successor of BAN was a logic by Gong et. al. in [GNY90] by the name GNY logic. One of the
improvements in GNY was to introduce the notion of recognizability which captures the recipient’s
14

expectation of the contents of a message before actually receiving it. For example, a principal may
recognize a particular structure of a message or any form of redundancy in the message. This is in
contrast to BAN which assumed that redundancy is always present in encrypted messages. GNY
also introduced the notion of not-originated-here to identify if a principal receives his own conveyed messages. In addition to extending the applicability of BAN to a wider range of protocols,
GNY also separated the notion of possession and beliefs. This allowed one to treat content of a
message and the information implied by a message separately because a principal may possess a
value but may not believe in it.
Abadi et. al. in [AT91] contributed towards providing new semantics to the logic of BAN.
In search of providing a sound semantics, they claimed to have identified many sources of confusion in the original work of BAN. For instance, the authors have given possible-world definition
of ‘belief’ as a form of resource-bounded, defeasible knowledge. They reformulated the BAN
logic, called AT logic, and proved their axiomatization to be sound with respect to their model of
computation and semantics. The AT logic was closer to traditional modal logics than BAN [SC01].
Paul van Oorschot extended the GNY logic to reason about protocols that involve DiffieHellman type key agreement [Oor93]. It was called VO logic. It can be seen that various successors of BAN logic tried to extend BAN in various aspects. Observing this diversity in the BAN
suite of logics, the need was felt to come up with a logic which should be sound with respect to its
model and which could unify its predecessors. SVO logic of [SO94] is such a logic which unifies
four of its predecessors, BAN, GNY, AT, and VO. Next, we briefly describe the SVO logic.
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2.4 The logic of SVO
The aim of the SVO logic was to unify four of its predecessors in a sound (with respect to its
computational model) way. We briefly describe the SVO logic given in [SC01] as follows.

2.4.1 SVO Notations
In addition to the BAN notations as describe above, SVO uses the following notations.
¬ϕ: SVO added the negation of formulae into its language.
A says X: It represents whatever is said in the current run of a protocol.
A has X: It represents all the initial messages of A plus all the messages that A has received,
freshly generated, or can construct using these messages.
k

PK(A, k): SVO represents BAN notation for public keys (7→ A) by PK(A, k). Furthermore, it
splits it into three different kinds of public-keys as PKψ (A, k), PKσ (A, k), and PKδ (A, k). PKψ (A, k)
represents public ciphering key of A. Only A can read messages encrypted with k. PKσ (A, k)
represents public signature key of A. k verifies that a message signed by k−1 is from A. PKδ (A, k)
represents public key-agreement key of A. A Diffie-Hellman key formed with k is shared with A.
For a detailed account on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, see [DH76].
bXck , {X}k : SVO separately represents signatures bXck and encryptions {X}k . When used in
signatures, k represents a private-key in bXck .
hXi∗A : It is used if A can not recognize a message (e.g., {X}k if A does not know k). However,
A will recognize hXi∗A as the same thing if received again even if it can not decrypt the message.
X f rom A: To represent a message is coming from A.
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2.4.2 SVO Inference Rules
SVO uses only two inference rules, Modus Ponens and Necessitation, given as follows.
Modus Ponens: From ` ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ` ψ.
Necessitation: From ` ϕ infer ` A believes ϕ.
Axioms of the logic are all instances of tautologies of classical propositional calculus, and all
instances of the following axiom schemata.

2.4.3 SVO Axioms
Belief Axioms: The following are the classic axioms of modal logic.
1. (A believes ϕ ∧ A believes (ϕ → ψ)) → A believes ψ
2. A believes ϕ → ϕ
3. A believes ϕ → A believes (A believes ψ)
4. ¬(A believes ϕ) → A believes (¬ A believes ψ)
These axioms represent that a principal believes the logical consequence of its beliefs, a principal’s beliefs are always true, a principal can tell what it believes, and a principal can also tell what
it does not believe2 .
Source Association Axioms: These axioms associate a principal who is responsible for sending
an encrypted/signed message. It is called message meaning rule in BAN.
k

5. (A ←→ B ∧ C received{X f rom B}k ) → (B said X ∧ B has X)
6. (PKσ (A, k) ∧ B received X ∧ S V(X, k, Y)) → A said Y
2

In modal logic, these axioms are named K, T, 4, and 5 respectively and are known as axioms of the Lewis system
S5 [Che80].
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Note that here ‘believes’ operator is separated from the axiom. Moreover, in the axiom for publickeys, S V(X, k, Y) means that applying k to X confirms that X is the result of signing Y with a private
cognate of k.
Key Agreement Axioms: This axiom captures Diffie-Hellman like key agreement. Diffie-Hellman
key agreement is an important component in widely used authenticated key established protocols
such as IETF standard Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [DH99]. The axiom states that session keys that are the result of good key-agreement keys are good.
F0 (kA ,kB )

7. (PKδ (A, kA ) ∧ PKδ (B, kB )) → A ←→ B
8. ϕ ≡ ϕ[F0 (k, k0 )/F0 (k0 , k)]
F0 (k0 , k) represents function that combines k0 with k−1 to form a shared key.
Receiving Axioms: These axioms state that the concatenates of a concatenated message and the
contents of an encrypted or a signed message are also viewed as received messages.
9. A received(X1 , . . . , Xn ) → A received Xi , for i = 1, . . . , n.
10. (A received{X}k ∧ A has k−1 ) → A received X
11. (A receivedbXck ) → A received X
Axiom 11 assumes that principals possess public keys.
Possession Axioms: A principal possesses all of its received messages plus any message obtained as a result of applying any computable function (e.g., encryption, signatures, etc.) on existing messages.
12. A received X → A has X
13. A has(X1 , . . . , Xn ) → A has Xi , for i = 1, . . . , n.
14. (A has X1 ∧ . . . ∧ A has Xn ) → A has F(X1 , . . . , Xn )
18

Comprehension Axiom: This axiom basically represents recognizability axiom of GNY [GNY90].
That is, a principal recognizes a function of a message only if he knows the message itself.
15. A believes(A has F(X)) → A believes(A has X)
Saying Axioms: The following axioms holds a principal responsible for saying each component
of a concatenated message. A principal who recently says X has said X.
16. A said(X1 , . . . , Xn ) → A said Xi ∧ A has Xi , for i = 1, . . . , n.
17. A says(X1 , . . . , Xn ) → (A said(X1 , . . . , Xn ) ∧ A says Xi ), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Freshness Axioms: These axioms state that a message containing any fresh component is also
fresh.
18. f resh(Xi ) → f resh(X1 , . . . , Xn ), for i = 1, . . . , n.
19. f resh(X1 , . . . , Xn ) → f resh F(X1 , . . . , Xn ), where F is any computable function which
depends upon all of its arguments.
Jurisdiction Axiom: A principal having authority on some messages is always right about those
messages.
20. (A controls ϕ ∧ A says ϕ) → ϕ
Nonce Verification Axiom: Something if said in the past such that it is fresh, is as if it is said in
the current run of a protocol.
21. ( f resh(X) ∧ A said X) → A says X
Symmetric Goodness Axiom: Symmetric-keys are equivalently good between two principals as
follows.
k

k

22. A ←→ B ≡ B ←→ A
The above-mentioned SVO axioms model a broad range of security protocols and provide a
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unified framework to analyze a protocol in proof-based setting. Since our work also focuses on
developing a proof-based verification environment for security protocols, we will use these SVO
axioms as a reference when we develop our framework in Chapter 4.

2.5 FDR
Gavin Lowe used Failures Divergences Refinement (FDR) [Ltd93] checker, a model checker for
CSP, to analyze cryptographic protocols [Low96]. All participants in a protocol are modeled by
CSP processes. Channels are defined that represent standard communication channel comm as well
as channels to capture intruder capabilities like fake and intercept. Moreover, additional channels
are defined like I running and I commit to represent that the initiator is running the protocol with
a responder, and the initiator is committing a session respectively. The intruder is also modeled as
having several capabilities. At any instant, the state of the intruder can be parameterized by the
knowledge it has acquired.
In order to exemplify the method, we take the example of Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. Assume the sets Initiator respresents initiators, Responder represents responders, Key represents public keys, and Nonce represents nonces. Also assume a, a0 ∈ Initiator, b ∈ Responder, k ∈
Key, na , nb ∈ Nonce. Then the three messages in NS protocol can be represented using three sets
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of communication events as follows.

MS G1 , {Msg1.a.b.Encrypt.k.na .a0 }
MS G2 , {Msg2.b.a.Encrypt.k.na .nb }
MS G3 , {Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.k.nb }
MS G , MS G1 ∪ MS G2 ∪ MS G3

The channels are defined as follows. “channel comm, f ake, intercept : MS G” represent standard communication channel, intruder’s faking messages, and intruder’s intercepting the messages. These channels assumes MS G as their type. Moreover, additional channels “channel
user, session, I running, R running, I commit, R commit : Initiator.Responder” are the channels
of the type Initiator.Responder that represent a user’s request to connect the initiator and the responder, a session channel, initiator’s taking part in a run of the protocol, responder’s taking part in
a run of the protocol, initiator committing to a session, and the responder committing to a session
respectively.
A CSP process INIT IAT OR(a, na ) represents an initiator with identity a and nonce na . Without

21

intruder action, this process is defined as follows.

INIT IAT OR(a, na ) , user.a?b → I running.a.b →
comm!Msg1.a.b.Encrypt.key(b).na .a →
comm.Msg2.b.a.Encrypt.key(a)?n0a .nb →
i f na = n0a then comm!Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.key(b).nb →
I commit.a.b → session.a.b → S kip
else S top

Now renaming is applied in order to cater the intruder who can intercept messages 1s and 3s and
can fake messages 2s. The resulting initiator is given as follows.

INIT IAT OR1(a, na ) , INIT IAT OR(A, Na )
[[comm.Msg1 ← comm.Msg1, comm.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
comm.Msg2 ← comm.Msg2, comm.Msg2 ← f ake.Msg2,
comm.Msg3 ← comm.Msg3, comm.Msg3 ← intercept.Msg3]]

The responder can also be defined similarly. The intruder is defined such that it can fake all the
messages using its knowledge base. It can also intercept all the message and learn new nonces if it
possesses the right decryption key.
In order to test whether any protocol meets its authentication goal, FDR takes two inputs,
a specification and an implementation. FDR then tests whether the implementation refines the
22

specification. The system is defined as the parallel composition of the agents and the intruder,
synchronizing on the set of channels. The system is represented as follows:

AGENT S , INIT IAT OR1|[{|comm, session.A.B|}]|RES PONDER1,
S YS T EM , AGENT S |[{| f ake, comm, intercept|}]|INT RUDER.

The above mentioned system represents parallel composition of all the processes in the system.
Running the system results into several traces. It is to be checked now that each trace of the implementation is also a trace of the specification. The specification for authentication of a responder
AR is given as:

AR0 , R running.A.B → I commit.A.B → AR0
A1 , {|R running.A.B, I commit.A.B|}
AR , AR0 |||RUN(Σ\A1 )

AR0 means that an I commit.A.B event should only occur after an R running.A.B event. If Σ is the
set of all events, then AR0 |||RUN(Σ\A1 ) represents occurring of all events in an arbitrary order. The
above specification says that the initiator A commits to a session with the responder B only if the
responder has really taken part in the protocol run. FDR can now be used to verify that SYSTEM
refines AR, indicating that the protocol correctly authenticates the responder.
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2.6 NRL Protocol Analyzer
Meadows NRL Analyzer in [Mea96] is a special purpose verification tool for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. It is a logic-based approach written in Prolog. It models the protocol as an
interaction between a set of state machines and attempts to prove a protocol secure by specifying
insecure states and attempting to prove them unreachable. The analyzer uses exhaustive search
backwards from the insecure state or by the use of proof techniques for reasoning about state machine models. The analyzer considers the domain in the form of word problem - a version of the
term-rewriting model of Dolev and Yao [DY83]. The Dolev-Yao model assumes that there is some
set of words (for example some secret keys possessed by honest participants, or some encrypted
messages) that the intruder does not know. The intruder’s goal is to find out these words. Moreover,
in NRL protocol analyzer, each participant of the protocol contains its own local state. The global
state of the system is simply the composition of these local states with some state information for
the environment or the penetrator. Each participant maintains some learned facts l f acts in its local
store. For example if user A attempts to initiate a conversation with user B during local round N at
time T , then the corresponding l f act is represented as follows.

l f act(user(A), N, init conv, T ) = [user(B)]

Similarly if user B receives a message X during local round S at time P apparently from user A
attempting to initiate a conversation, then the corresponding l f act is represented as follows.

l f act(user(B), S , rcvd init conv, P) = [user(A), X]
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The NRL protocol analyzer uses unification in which an incomplete state description represents a
set of states. The steps of the protocol are represented as conditional rewriting rules and the goals
are formalized as unreachability theorems.
Meadows uses the NARROWER algorithm [PL85] that begins with a trivial set of words that
an intruder possesses. A set of secrets is defined which the intruder is not supposed to know.
Then the algorithm uses induction on the length of path in an attempt to find any path, starting
from the initial state, such that the intruder may learn the words in the secret set. The system also
models the knowledge and belief of the intruder and defines a set of rules whereby an intruder
can learn new information based on protocol steps. The NRL protocol analyzer defines a set
of requirements using some pre-defined actions that specifies a class of protocols. For instance,
consider the following requirement that contains two conditions:
• ¬( accept(B, A, M, N) ∧  learn(Z, M))
• accept(B, A, M, N)) → (send(A, B, (Query, M)) ∧  request(B, A, Query, N))
The first condition says if participant B accepted a message M from participant A at some point
in the past (the past time operator ), then the intruder did not learn M at some point in the past.
Second condition says that if B accepted message M from A in B’s local round N then A sent M to B
as a response to a query at B’s local round N. After the transition rules are defined for honest agents
and the operations available to all agents are described, the atoms needs to be defined that serves
as the basic building block of the words in the protocol. Finally, the rewrite rules are described.
An example of a rewrite rule is given below which says that encryption and decryption with the
same key are self canceling.
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rr1 : pke(privkey(X), pke(pubkey(X), Y)) ⇒ Y
rr2 : pke(pubkey(X), pke(privkey(X), Y)) ⇒ Y
The tool needs high level of expert user interaction. It performs backward search from some
insecure state. If the initial state is found, then the path to the initial state represents the counterexample.

2.7 The Inductive Approach
Paulson in [Pau98] introduced the inductive approach with automated support provided by his
Isabelle proof assistant. Traces are described as the sequence of events that could occur as the
protocol agents execute in a hostile environment. Traces are defined inductively from a set of
rules that correspond to the possible actions of the agents, including spies. Paulson uses inductive
definitions that list the possible actions that an agent or system can perform. Then the induction
rule is used to reason about the consequences of an arbitrary finite sequence of actions. The attacker
is modeled using inductively defined operators analz and synth.
The operator partsH represents the set of all components of H that can be obtained from it.
The set analzH represents the most that could be obtained from H without breaking ciphers. The
set synthH represents the set of messages a penetrator can build up from the elements of H. Only
the known messages (or elements) can be used to build up new messages.
A protocol is described in terms of events of different forms. Two forms of events in a trace
are defined: S ays A B X, and Notes A X, which means respectively that A sends message X to B
and A stores X internally. Three additional rules are defined in order to capture the notion of empty
trace (an empty list []), fake messages (if X ∈ synth(analzH) is a fraudulent message and B , S py
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then, S ays S py B X) and accidents (if S distributed the session key K in a run involving the nonces
Na and Nb, then Notes S py {Na, Nb, K}). Induction is applied on the set of traces. For the set
of traces, the induction principle says that P(evs) holds for each trace evs provided property P is
preserved under all the rules for creating traces. P[] is proved to cover the empty trace. For each of
the other rules, an assertion of the form P(evs) ⇒ P(ev#evs) is proved where event ev, containing
the new message, is added to the trace evs.
The requirements to check a security property of a protocol is given in a syntax identical to that
used to model the protocol. For instance, in the case of Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol,
the requirement may be that if an initiator A sends the nonce Na to the responder B in its first message and receives the second message back that contains Na , then B must have sent this message.
Unlike other model checking approaches, Paulson’s approach is totally based on theorem proving.
Because of its inductive nature, Paulson’s method places no limit on the number of instances and
an arbitrary number of instances can be considered with this approach. However, being a theorem prover, it can not generate counterexamples in case of a failure and there is no guarantee of
termination.

2.8 Murφ
Murφ in [MMS97] is an example of general purpose model-checker in which global state variables
along with some shared variables (to model communication) are used to represent the state of the
system. The transition rules describe the change between honest agent’s states and the addition
of new messages into the network. The rules that capture the behavior of the penetrator are constructed. Since the description should be finite state, it cannot represent infinite behavior of the
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penetrator. That is, the penetrator can learn only finite number of words specific to the particular
protocol. The specification for the protocol is represented by an invariant on the reachable global
states of the system. It is difficult to specify secrecy property in this approach because of the
problem in keeping track of the knowledge of each participant of the protocol.
The Murφ language is a high-level language for describing nondeterministic finite-state machines. First the protocol is modeled in this language, and then the desired properties to be verified
is specified by invariants, which are boolean conditions that have to be true in every reachable
state. The state showing the violation of the invariant contributes the flaw in the protocol. Lets
take the example of Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol and see its model in murφ. The data
structure for the initiator is given below.
const
NumInitiators: 1;
type
InitiatorId: scalarset (NumInitiators);
InitiatorStates: enum{I_SLEEP,I_WAIT,I_COMMIT};
Initiator: record
state: InitiatorStates;
responder: AgentId;
end;
var
ini: array [InitiatorId] of Initiator;
The state of each initiator is stored in the array ini. I_SLEEP, I_WAIT, and I_COMMIT rep28

resent that the initiator has not started the protocol, the initiator has started the protocol, and the
initiator is committing the protocol respectively. The behavior of an initiator is modeled by two
murφ rules. In the first rule, the initiator starts the protocol by sending the first message of NS protocol and changes its local state from I_SLEEP to I_WAIT. The second rule models the reception
and checking of the second message of NS protocol, and then committing (I_WAIT to I_COMMIT)
and sending the final message.
Finally the invariants represents the correctness specification of the protocol as follows.
invariant "responder correctly authenticated"
forall i: InitiatorId do
ini[i].state = I_COMMIT &
ismember(ini[i].responder, ResponderId)
->
res[ini[i].responder].initiator = i &
( res[ini[i].responder].state = R_WAIT |
res[ini[i].responder].state = R_COMMIT )
end;
It says that for each initiator i, if it committed to a session with a responder, this responder (with the
identifier stored in ini[i].responder) must have started the protocol with initiator i, i.e, have
stored i in its field initiator and be in state R_WAIT or R_COMMIT. The intruder maintains a set
of overheard messages and an array of all known nonces. Three rules represent an intruder: one
for overhearing and intercepting messages, one for replaying messages from the set of overheard
messages, and one for generating messages using the known nonces and injecting them into the
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network.

2.9 Strand Spaces
Guttman et al. presented a graph-theoretic approach [FG98], Strand Space Method (SSM), to
prove certain security properties manually, for example, authentication and secrecy. We first briefly
mention some of the basic terms used in SSM.
The set of actions Act that principals can take during the execution of a protocol include actions
such as send (denoted by +) and receive (denoted by -). An event is a pair haction, ai, where
action ∈ Act, and a ∈ A is the argument of the action from the set of terms A. A strand is a
sequence of events that a participant may engage in. For a legitimate participant, each strand is a
sequence of message sends and receives; it represents the action of that party in a particular run
of the protocol. A collection of strands for various legitimate protocol parties with penetratorstrands defines strand space. A strand space Σ over A is a set S together with the trace mapping
tr : S → (±A)∗ . A bundle consists of a number of strands hooked together where one strand sends
a message and another strand receives the same message. In other words, a bundle is a portion of
a strand space large enough to represent a full protocol exchange. A node is a pair hs, ii with s ∈ S
and i an integer satisfying 1 ≤ i ≤ length(tr(s)). The set of nodes is denoted by N. Each node
belongs to a unique strand. T erm(n) = (tr(s))i , i.e, the ith signed term in the trace of s. There is an
edge n1 → n2 if and only if term(n1 ) = +a and term(n2 ) = −a for some a ∈ A. When n1 = hs, ii
and n2 = hs, i + 1i are members of N, there is an edge n1 ⇒ n2 .
The penetrator’s capabilities are also encoded in terms of strands of different forms like M, F, T,
C, S, K, E, D, representing text message, flushing, tee, concatenation, separation, key encryption,
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and decryption respectively. Strand space method uses the idea of -minimality in order to get
the minimal member from a set of terms with respect to the causal relations ⇒ and →. Given a
protocol containing some secrets, SSM tries to find out who could first originate that secret by
tracking backward (using the relations ⇒ and →) all possible strands (of either a legitimate user
or a penetrator) that could have originated the secret .
SSM uses the agreement properties by Lowe [Low97] to prove authentication. Agreement
property says that a protocol guarantees a participant B (say, as the responder) agreement for
certain data items x if each time a participant B completes a run of the protocol as responder using
x, apparently with A, then there is a run of the protocol with the principal A as initiator using x,
apparently with B. The notion of secrecy is defined as a data value x is secret in a bundle C if for
every n ∈ C, term(n) , x. A tool has been developed based on this model called Athena [SBP01].

2.10 BRUTUS
Brutus [CJM00], a special-purpose model checker for security protocols, is a finite state-transition
system that models the principals and the intruder running a protocol. It checks secrecy and the authentication properties in a protocol. Secrecy is checked by defining a set of terms that the intruder
is not allowed to obtain and the authentication is checked using the correspondence properties of
Woo and Lam [WL93].
Brutus uses some rules to define message derivability relation in order to model the capabilities
of the adversary. A protocol is modeled as an asynchronous composition of a set of named communicating processes which model the honest agents and the penetrator. Brutus makes the model
finite by placing a bound on the number of sessions (number of times a principal may attempt to
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execute the protocol). Each session is modeled as a principal instantiating some role in the protocol, called an instance. Each instance is described as a separate copy or instantiation of a principal
and consists of a single execution of the sequence of actions that make up that agent’s role in the
protocol, along with all the variable bindings and knowledge acquired during the execution. A
principal can have multiple instances, but each instance is executed once. The entire model for the
protocol is obtained by combining these instances with a single instance of the adversary. A trace
is defined as each possible execution of the model, and can be obtained from a finite alternating
sequence of global states and actions. Two kinds of actions are defined: send and receive, and
some user-defined actions.
In order to specify properties of a protocol, Brutus uses first-order logic in the model. Modal
logic is also combined with the predicate logic in order to capture the notion of past-time operator.
In this way, one can use the past-time operator to talk about the things that happened in the history
of a particular protocol run. The atomic propositions of the logic allows to refer to the bindings of
variables in the model, to actions that occur during execution of the protocol, and to the knowledge
of the different agents participating in the protocol. The logic used can be seen as a variant of the
linear-time temporal logic with the past-time operator where one can express actions and knowledge. After the protocol is modeled, the model checker runs and checks the desired specifications
in each of its states. Like any model checker, it gives the the trace of the run (a counterexample)
whenever any state does not meet the specification.

32

2.11

Other Approaches

ASTRAL in [KD97] is another example of model checker and [Coh00, HS00] have developed special purpose theorem provers for cryptographic protocol analysis. Special purpose model checkers
were designed as in [SBP01] and in [MCJ97].
Another tool-based approach , the Interrogator, was developed by Millen at MITRE. These
can be found out in [KMM94]. Protocol is modeled as communicating state machines in which
intruder can destroy, intercept, modify every messages. Given a final state, in which intruder knows
message supposed to be secret, Interrogator constructs every possible attack scenario and verify
the protocol against this state. Interrogator have successfully revealed published vulnerabilities of
several protocol.
Kemmerer applied the formal method FDM with the specification language InaJo to the problem [Kem89]. FDM uses state machine with conditional transition rules for protocol steps. The
security properties were represented using predicates on the states. Later, Kemmerer and colleagues applied a model-checker for real-time concurrent system specification language ASTRAL
for the analysis of cryptographic protocols [KD97].
In early 1990s Abrial applied his B-method in which the protocol is formalized in the Abstract
Machine Notation (AMN) of the B-method and the security properties were represented in terms
of invariants. The proof of the security properties was performed using the process of step-wise
refinement in which first the goal of a protocol is expressed as a single magic step. Then, this top
level step is progressively refined towards the actual protocol steps, showing that the appropriate
invariants are preserved. Bieber and others refined this approach, for example, in [BB94]
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Longley and Rigby [LR92] describe a rule-based system used to test the vulnerability of a key
management scheme to specified attacks. The system uses an exhaustive search to determine if a
given attack is successful. When the system halts, then the history of rule firings can give an attack
strategy.
Abadi and Gordon’s spi-calculus in [AG97] is an extension of Milner’s π-calculus, a development of Milner’s process algebra CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems). The pi calculus
(without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols. The spi calculus considers cryptographic
issues in more detail. The protocols are represented as processes in the spi calculus and their
security properties are stated in terms of notions of protocol equivalence.
Abadi proposed type checking [Aba99] which is a new approach toward protocol analysis.
They developed informal principles and formal rules for achieving secrecy properties in security
protocols. In this approach, each piece of data and each communication channel has to be labeled
as either secret or public. Secret data should not be sent on public channels, and secret channels
should not be made available to everyone. This approach has a potential disadvantage of defining
security violations in terms of type inconsistencies. Hence the security requirements must be
considered when the specifications are being written.
Researchers have tried different approaches towards the problem of verifying cryptographic
protocols over the span of 20 years. It has been shown that the protocol security problem is undecidable [EG83, HT96, CDL99]. So one can argue that the designed tools to solve this problem
will not be successful all the time and will continue to need some human assistance. We have
summarized the list of notations used in various approaches in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Symbol Table
Symbol

Meaning

ϕ
M
T
V

Any logical formula
Plaintext
Two-party name-stamp protocol
String of operators that an intruder
can apply on any message
d
Deleting an id from a string
dX
Deleting a known id X from a string
A |≡ #(M) A believes that a message M is fresh
k

7 A
→
k
kAB
PK(A, k)
PKσ (A, k)
bXck
F0 (k0 , k)
[M]KX

k is a public-key of A
Encryption (public) key
Shared key b/w A and B
k is public key of A
k is public signature key of A
X is signed by k
Function that combines k0 with k−1
to form a shared key
Message M with a signature that
can be verified using public key KX

Symbol

Meaning

Γ
A, B, X, Y, S
EA
DA
Ni (X, Y)
iX
Ti
DX

Set of formulas
Participant ID
Encryption function
Decryption funcation
Sequence of texts transmitted between X and Y
Append operation
Time stamp i
Decryption using X’s private key

k

A ←→ B
X, Y
k−1
¬ϕ
PKψ (A, k)
PKδ (A, k)
{X}k
Na
hXi∗A
X f rom A
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k is a shared key between A and B
Concatenation of two messages X and Y in BAN
Decryption (private) key
Negation of formulae
k is public ciphering key of A
k is public key-agreement key of A
X is encrypted by k
Participant A’s nonce
A can not recognize a message
A message X is coming from A

CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF A SECURE SYSTEM

In today’s world overwhelmed with electronic devices, trust in electronic commerce applications
and reliance web security have become an important issue. Today’s environment for critical applications such as e-commerce are vulnerable, in that the eavesdroppers may be listening on communication lines, or routers might have been re-programmed to look for credit card details. The
communication channel is assumed to be available to any rogue entity known as penetrator, saboteur, or intruder. In addition to passive eavesdropping, a penetrator is generally assumed to be
equipped with functionalities such as encryption, decryption, copying, forwarding, blocking and
so on. Protecting critical applications in such environment became a cumbersome task. Below we
describe the notion of a secure system and lay down the foundation upon which the security goals
can be achieved.

3.1 Security Engineering
Security in general and broader sense contains several addressable issues like secrecy, authentication, etc. Security of a system can be represented in terms of three parameters. First and foremost
comes the policy. The security policy aims to define the exact semantics and underlying notions
related to it. Security is typically defined for a specific domain and within a given context. The
definition of security for one domain may not be applicable for another domain. The purpose of
defining a policy is to elucidate the terms and notions related to specific situation and to give it a
clear semantics. After the policy for security is well understood, then comes the need to devise
a mechanism for that policy. A mechanism is a way to achieving security goals. Security threats
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needs to be clearly understood and then one needs to define security goals in order to counter those
threats. Security threats encompass several issues including unauthorized access, data leaks, system integrity loss, data manipulation, denial of service, data fraud, viruses, data theft, trojan horses,
data destruction, information loss, and program manipulation. In the similar vein, security goals
may include entity identification, entity authentication, anonymity, data integrity, data authenticity,
confidentiality, source verifiability, availability, privacy, non-repudiation, etc. Mechanism to establish a secure system includes several layers of operations that may range from defining specific
arrangements and settings for each security device, to coming up with a set of protocols designed
to achieve each security goal. The goal of a protocol should be clearly stated and then the protocol
should be rigorously analyzed to see if it meets its goals. Last, but certainly not the least, comes
the assurance to see if the underlying mechanism meets the policy, and to devise methods for system recovery in case of a successful attack. History has shown that even after the security system
enjoys circumspect designed and attains careful implementation, the security leaks do not cease to
exist. Measures to assure system recovery is essential in order to be able to backup the system in
the case of a failure.

3.2 Communication Channels
In terms of message delivery, the communication channels can be broadly categorized into three
groups. Unreliable channels have infinite possible delays and provide no guarantee on the correct
order of received messages. Resilient channels result in finite delays but contain no guarantee on
the order of messages. In operational channels, messages are instantly transmitted to the recipient.
Therefore, the analysis of a secure system must imbue a penetrator with powerful capabilities to
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model all sorts of possible attacks arising either due to the leaks in the security protocol, or flaws
in the communication channel. Generally the communication channel can be assumed as a hostile
environment which is open to all the participants, legitimate or otherwise, communicating with
each other.

3.3

Authentication Protocols

In this exposition, we focus on the authentication property of a security protocol. In particular,
our target is entity authentication. Authentication is the act of determining the identity of a principal (such as a person, computer, or server) in a computer system. An authentication protocol is
a description of how some secrets are distributed to principals, and how these secrets are used to
determine principal’s identities [AT91]. Authentication protocols typically consists of some participants (say initiator or responder) playing in the protocol and a trusted server. In the case of
public-key protocols, the trusted server, called certificate authority, is assumed to provide the public keys to the participants. The notion of public-key cryptography was first given by Diffie and
Hellman [DH76]. Hitherto, several researchers have proposed and developed public-key schemes
based on different problems such as discrete log problem, knapsack problem, and number factoring
problem. On the other hand, in the case of symmetric-key protocols, the job of the trusted server,
called authentication server, is to provide a short-lived symmetric key to the participants so that
they can use it for a particular session of the protocol.

38

3.4 Assumptions
Design and analysis of security protocols have undergone a wide set of assumptions and constraints
that the secure applications and systems put on them. We lay out these assumptions and list all the
properties that we assume during the design of a secure protocol.
1. In a protocol environment each participant is associated with a unique ID. Moreover, for
each ID there is a key (or a pair of public-private keys in case of asymmetric cryptosystem)
associated with it.
2. In a typical protocol using symmetric cryptosystem, it is assumed that the participants possess relevant symmetric keys even before the start of the protocol. In case of asymmetric
system, each participant is in possession of his private key K −1 . Its public cognate, K, is
generally assumed to be well known.
3. A protocol message primarily consists of a set of basic terms with some operations applied
on them. Basic operations are concatenation and encryption. We assume that in a protocol
two messages are equal if and only if they share common atomic terms and apply identical
operators in the exact order. Typically, it is represented as: {X}K1 = {Y}K2 iff X = Y ∧
K1 = K2 .
4. Generally, during the analysis of a protocol, encrypting a message more than once is not
considered. Earlier work has shown that double or multiple encryptions do not serve a better
purpose than a single encryption. Instead, sometimes it is detrimental to encrypt a message
more than once [DY83].
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5. We assume ideal cryptography where all participants share limited computational and cryptanalytic abilities. We assume that the protocol is uniform as is assumed in [DY83], that is,
all participants have similar vocabularies. Thus if we exchange all X by Y and Y by X in Σ x ,
we will get Σy . It is a fair assumption on behalf of all participants and their knowledge-base.
6. While analyzing a protocol, some assumptions may be made that greatly simplify the overall
analysis mechanism. We assume that there are no type flaws, no redundant messages, and
no permutation of message components of a concatenated message, in order to make the
analysis feasible. However, certain kinds of redundancies are important in a protocol. For
instance, redundancies are always considered that help clarify the syntax of the protocol
messages.

3.5 Achieving Authentication Goals
Properties like freshness, timeliness, and uniqueness of some data items are essential in achieving
goals such as authentication and secrecy. The notion of secrecy is usually defined by the idea
that the secret term x should not be present in any protocol run played by all the participants of
a protocol [FG98]. Moreover, after the protocol has finished, all the participants playing by the
protocol should agree on their shared secrets. The design of an authentication protocol should
respect these properties as described in detail as follows.

3.5.1

Data Freshness

It is vital to provide guarantee that the messages in a run of authentication protocol are fresh. It
ensures that the communicating messages are not the replay of the old messages. For this purpose,
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generally a fresh data item is generated at each run of a protocol. Any message that is bound
to this freshly generated data is also assumed to be fresh. It is important to note that the fresh
data item should be tightly bound with the rest of the message whose freshness is required for the
proper operation of the protocol. This binding can be achieved, for example, by first concatenating
the fresh data item with the rest of the message, and then encrypting the entire message with
some secret key. In order to generate fresh data item, different schemes have been analyzed and
incorporated. The use of a sequence number from a random selected seed, a time stamp, and a
random number generated once (called a nonce) are some of the solutions proposed in order to
conceptualize the notion of freshness. There are some pros and cons associated with each of these
approaches. The use of a sequence number, for instance, is advantageous where the processing
power of the computing device is available at high costs. In that case, generating a pure random
number every time a session of a protocol is initiated, is infeasible. However, the advantage of
using sequence number comes with the problem of having a non-volatile memory so that the server
does not reset its count every time it is shut down and restarted. Moreover, guessing a sequence
number is easier than guessing a nonce, hence a counter based scheme is attacker-prone. Using
a nonce is more reliable but computationally expensive method. Time stamp, on the other hand,
seems an attractive choice, but it suffers from clock synchronization problems. It is a good design
strategy to come up with a hybrid of these approaches and utilize the advantages of each of them
according to the constraints of the system at hand.

41

3.5.2

Agreement Properties

Gavin Lowe [Low97] proposed agreement properties for authentication protocols. A protocol
guarantees an agreement property for a participant B (e.g. acting as a responder) for a certain set
of parameters x, if each time the principal B completes a run of the protocol as a responder using
x, supposedly with A, then there is a unique run of the protocol with the principal A initiating a
session with the same parameters x, supposedly with B. A weaker non-injective agreement does not
ensure uniqueness, but requires only that each time a principal B completes a run of the protocol
as responder using x, supposedly with A, then there is a run of the protocol with the principal A as
the initiator using x, supposedly with B [Low97]. We take an example protocol from the literature,
namely Needham-Shroeder (NS) public-key protocol. NS protocol is a classical protocol that has
been serving as a test bench for several methods in this field.
In its simplest form, NS can be represented as:

1. A → B : {ANa }Kb
2. B → A : {Na Nb }Ka
3. A → B : {Nb }Kb

A first challenges B by sending its nonce Na with its ID encrypted with B0 s public key. B dreams
up a new nonce Nb and replies the challenge by sending an encrypted message containing both
nonces. A finally completes the protocol by sending back B0 s nonce in the encrypted form.
The set of parameters for this protocol contains four variables: X (presumably the initiator),
Y (presumably a responder), N x (initiator’s secret), and Ny (responder’s secret). Notice that by
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the time the initiator receives a reply in its second message, its parameter list X, Y, N x , and Ny
binds to A, B, Na , and Nb respectively. In order to ensure authentication from initiator’s side of the
protocol, he needs to guarantee (by convincing himself) that the corresponding apparent responder
also shares the same vocabulary, that is, A, B, Na , and Nb . In the similar vein, the responder should
also convince himself about the agreement of his data items with that of the initiator.
Agreement on data items seems necessary in order to ensure authentication between participants. A good number of attacks on security protocols resulted in disparity of data items among
legitimate participants playing in a protocol. Disagreement either in the participant’s ids or in the
values of their secrets is a major cause of subtle attacks found in the literature. The following
subsection further illustrates the point with an example.

3.5.3 Agreement Between Secret Values
Agreement is an important concept, in that the goal of a protocol may not be achieved even after
the secrecy property is satisfied. Agreement in the shared secrets means that after a protocol has
finished, all the participants playing by the protocol should agree on their shared secrets. To make
our point, we consider another protocol, by Otway and Rees, that resulted into mismatched keys
after an attack in [FHG99]. Otway-Rees protocol [OR87] consists of three participants in which
two participants want to obtain a shared secret given by a server. Attacked Otway-Rees protocol is
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given below:

1. A → B : MAB{Na MAB}KAS
2. B → P : MAB{Na MAB}KAS {Nb MAB}KBS
3. P → S : MAB{Na MAB}KAS {Nb MAB}KBS
4. S → B : M{Na KAB }KAS {Nb KAB }KBS
30 . P → S : MAB{Na MAB}KAS {Nb MAB}KBS
0
0
40 . S → P : M{Na KAB
}KAS {Nb KAB
}KBS
0
5. P → A : M{Na KAB
}KAS

Notice how the penetrator P attacks the protocol such that A and B get unmatched secret session
keys after communicating with the server S . The penetrator simply forwards the message obtained
0
from B to the server twice in order to get two mismatched keys KAB and KAB
. Then, the penetrator

uses simple separation operation on the concatenated message from the server to complete the
protocol run for participants A and B.

3.5.4

Secure Functions

Authentication methods can be implemented using different schemes in a security protocol. Encryption is the main method used to achieve authentication goals. Symmetric or asymmetric encryption can be used in a protocol so as to implement authentication. Message Authentication
Code (MAC) functions of the text and the keys, and Hash (normally non-invertible) functions and
involving secret keys are other ways of implementing security goals like authentication. Several
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protocols have been designed such that they utilize combination of these techniques to meet their
objectives. For instance, consider the following simplified version of the TLS protocol [DA99] that
utilizes both the public key cryptography (to sign a message) and the message hashing (to obtain a
key) to achieve its goals.

1. C → S : C
2. S → C : S [g x ]KS
3. C → S : [gy ]KC {T 1CS }K 0
4. S → C : {T 2CS }K 0

In the above protocol, T 1 and T 2 are fixed tags to distinguish the third message from the fourth.
[M]KX is the message M with a signature that can be verified using the public key KX . Here K 0 is a
symmetric key created by hashing the value g xy .

3.5.5 Underlying Cryptosystem
Design of the authentication protocols depends heavily on the underlying cryptosystem used to
achieve security goals. For instance, the protocols using public key cryptography suffers from the
constraint that an encrypted message does not provide guarantee for the identity of the sender of
the message, or at least the originator of the message. The reason being obviously the fact that
anyone can compose a message masquerading someone else by using public key of the intended
recipient. That is why, protocols using public key cryptography typically rely on a challenge
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response criterion in order to achieve authentication. In such protocols, the initiator usually dreams
up a random number as a challenge and sends out this challenge after encrypting it with the public
key of the recipient. The responder, upon receiving the challenge, tries to respond to the initiator
often by including its own challenge in case if two-way authentication is desired. The symmetric
key cryptography, on the other hand, has the advantage that an encrypted message contains some
guarantees about the originator of the message. Therefore, there is no need to send an encrypted
challenge, or any challenge at all. Rather, any random number or a time stamp can be sent to the
intended recipient, even in an un-encrypted form. This ensures that the participants playing in the
current session of the protocol do not become victim of replay attacks. Let us illustrate the point
by giving an example protocol based on symmetric keys. The protocol below is designed simply
for illustrative purpose and we do not intend to make any claim about its security.

1. A → B : T 1 AB
2. B → A : {T 2 AB}KAB
3. A → B : {T 3 AB}KAB

Here T 1 , T 2 and T 3 are time stamps, and KAB is a symmetric key used by participants A and B.
Notice that how utilizing different cryptographic schemes affects the design of a simple protocol.

3.5.6

The Notion of Security

As mentioned earlier, declaring a protocol secure is heavily contingent upon how the notion of
security is defined. Different notions of security entails different design issues related to it. A
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protocol declared secure according to one situation may be highly vulnerable in different situation.
For instance, consider below the two party name stamp protocol discussed by Dolev and Yao in
[DY83].

1. A → B : A{MA}KB B
2. B → A : B{MB}KA A

This protocol is claimed to be secure. However, its security is contingent upon the intention of the
initiator of this protocol. It is clear that the protocol does not achieve two-way guarantees about
any secrets in it. The participant B has no way of assuring that the secret M is indeed sent by the
participant A because anyone can construct the first message using the public key of the recipient.

3.6 The Penetrator
An important parameter worth mentioning in the design of a security protocol is how to model
the penetrator. The penetrator may be modeled explicitly or a formal system may capture the
capabilities of a penetrator implicitly. The way a penetrator’s capabilities are assessed and analyzed
greatly affects the design of a secure protocol. Plethora of security leaks in some well known
protocols resulted from misunderstanding the penetrator and his abilities. For instance, in the logic
of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham, called BAN logic [BAN90], the authors made the assumption of
trusted participants in the protocol. This was the reason that BAN overlooked the hidden flaw while
analyzing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol for its authentication property. Lowe’s
attack on NS protocol [Low96] greatly motivated the researchers towards giving a clear semantics
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on the capabilities of the penetrator. Understanding the capabilities of a penetrator greatly helps
design a secure protocol. A stringent approach may assume all participants of the protocol to be
the penetrators until and unless they complete their part of the protocol run exactly as specified by
the protocol. To flip the coin, an equivalent strategy is to assume all penetrators to be the legitimate
participants of the protocol. Notice that the above mentioned definition of the penetrator is quite
strict, but this conservativeness seems essential for the design of a safe protocol.

3.6.1 Capabilities of a Penetrator
From the notion of a penetrator given above, we can describe the set of operation that a penetrator can perform on messages he receives from the network. The penetrator may also apply any
combination of these operations in order to find a successful attack in a protocol.
Generation A penetrator is generally assumed to generate messages from the set of messages he
possesses. He may generate new messages using some operations performed on this set.
Forwarding Forwarding is defined as sending a message after receiving it from some participant.
A penetrator is equipped with the ability to forward any message in the network to any
participant he likes.
Copying Message copying can be done by simply duplicating the data item even though the ingredients of the data items are unknown to a participant. The notion of a penetrator possess
this property that he can copy any message to create it duplicates as many times as he wants
in order to attack a protocol.
Deleting A penetrator can obtain any message from the network and then can flush it out from the
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network. This is similar to deleting of messages from a public network channel.
Concatenation A penetrator is assumed to be able to perform concatenation on two messages he
possesses.
Encryption A penetrator is assumed to able to encrypt any data item it possess with any key he
possesses. This can result in infinite number of messages that a penetrator can generate by
simply encrypting a message over and over using a key. However, in a realistic scenario,
only a bounded number of encryption suffices the analysis.
Decryption Similar to encryption, a penetrator is capable of decrypting a message using a key he
possesses. The key may have been obtained by any successful attack on a protocol, or he
may have performed cryptanalysis on any old session key to obtain the key.
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CHAPTER 4
OUR WORK

Since our work focuses on developing a proof-based method from distributed temporal protocol
logic, we first briefly describe the the Distributed Temporal Protocol Logic. From this chapter
onward, we will be using the set of symbols given in Table 4.1.

4.1

The Distributed Temporal Protocol Logic

We briefly introduce the distributed temporal protocol logic of [CVB05a], a version of the distributed temporal logic DTL, to reason about protocols and their properties. In DTPL, a distributed
system is viewed as a collection of communicating sequential objects (principals or agents) that interact by exchanging messages through an insecure channel Ch. A security protocol comprises of
a sequence of messages sent and received by two or more principals in a distributed system. DTPL
represents a protocol by capturing the temporal aspect of the sequence of actions of each principal
executing the protocol. We usually represent by A the set of messages that principals communicate
where we refer to the elements of A as terms or messages. Moreover, we assume algebra freeness
in which A is freely generated from two disjoint sets, T (for texts, e.g, nonces or principal ids) and
K (for keys). It implies that two syntactically different terms can not represent the same message.
In particular if M, M 0 , N, N 0 represent terms and k and k0 are keys, then according to the algebra
freeness assumption:
1) {M}k = {M 0 }k0 ⇒ M = M 0 ∧ k = k0 ,
2) MN = M 0 N 0 ⇒ M = M 0 ∧ N = N 0 ,
3) MN , {M 0 }k .
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Table 4.1: Symbol Table for DTPL
Symbol

Meaning

Symbol

Meaning

>
k
{M}k
Ch
T
M, M 0 , N, N 0
ActA

True
Encryption (public) key
Encrypting message M with key k
Channel
Text message
Terms
Actions of principal A

⊥
k−1
MN
A
K
k, k0
PropA

False
Decryption (private) key
Concatenating messages M and N
Set of messages
Set of keys
Keys
State propositions of Participant A

k is public-encryption key of principal A

@i [φ]

φ holds at the current local state of principal i

ψ

A 7→ k
σ

A 7→ k
⇒
j:φ
L
℘(Propi )
act
µ
ξ|i
ξi
→i
πi

δ

k is public-signature verification key

A 7→ k

of principal A
Conditional
Principal i has communicated with
principal j for whom φ held
Global language
Local state propositions of principal i
action
Interpretation structure
ξ ∩ Evi
Local configuration of principal i
Local successor relation b/w events in Evi
Associates a set of local state
propositions to each local configuration
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k

k is public key-agreement key of principal A

A↔B
k is shared key b/w A and B
MX , X @ M Message M contains term X
λ
Distributed life-cycle
Evi
Set of events of principal i
Li
Local language of principal i
Global satisfaction relation
Local satisfaction relation
ψ, φ
Logical formula
Γ
Set of formulas
αi
Associates a local action to each local event
Ξi
Set of local configurations of principal i
ξ
global configuration
e↓
{e0 ∈ Ev|e0 →∗ e}

Local alphabet of each principal A comprises of actions ActA and state propositions PropA .
ActA includes operations such as sending a message M to principal B, send(M, B), receiving a
message M, rec(M), spying a message M, spy(M), generating a nonce N, nonce(N), and generating a key k, key(k) whereas PropA includes only knowing a message M, knows(M). Channel’s
actions ActCh include receiving a message M from principal A, in(M, A), sending a message M to
principal A, out(M, A), and leaking any message, leak and there is no state proposition associated
with the channel.
DTPL captures all the local actions and local state propositions of a principal i using its local
language Li . Local languages of all principals and interactions among them is captured by means
of global language L. The global language and the local language of the logic are defined by the
grammar1 :
L ::= @i [Li ]| ⊥ |L ⇒ L
Li ::= Acti |Propi | ⊥ |Li ⇒ Li |Li U Li |Li S Li | j : L j
where,
• i, j ∈ Princ, a set of principal’s ids.
• U and S are temporal operators until and since,
• @i [φ] means that φ holds at the current local state of principal i, and
• j : φ appearing inside a formula in Li is called a communication formula. It means that
principal i has just communicated with principal j for whom φ held.
1

DTPL uses ⇒ to represent the conditional instead of → used in the previous section in other logics. We follow
the DTPL’s notation in order to avoid confusion since DTPL uses → for other purposes.
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Due to the concurrent nature of the distributed system, event structures are used instead of Kripke
structures as the interpretation structures in DTPL. In DTPL, λ, a prime event structure without
conflict built form Evi , is called a distributed life-cycle. The interpretation structure µ = hλ, α, πi
of L are suitably labeled distributed life-cycles, built upon a simplified form of Winskel’s event
structures [Win87]. If Evi represents a discrete, linearly ordered, set of events for each principal
i ∈ Id:
• λ: is a distributed life-cycle.
• αi : Evi → Acti associates a local action to each local event.
• πi : Ξi → ℘(Propi ) associates a set of local state propositions to each local configuration ξi
in the set of local configurations Ξi .
Here, local configuration of a principal i means a collection of all the local events that have occurred up to a given point. In other words, local configuration of a principal i is a finite set ξi ⊆ Evi
closed under local causality. That is, if →i represents the local successor relation between the
events in Evi , e →∗i e0 , and e0 ∈ ξi then also e ∈ ξi . Every non-empty local configuration ξi is
reached by the occurrence of an event last(ξi ) from the local configuration ξi \last(ξi ). A global
configuration is a finite set ξ ⊆ Ev closed under global causality, that is, if e →∗ e0 , and e0 ∈ ξ
then also e ∈ ξ. Every global configuration ξ includes the local configuration ξ|i = ξ ∩ Evi of each
principal i. Moreover, given e ∈ Ev, e ↓= {e0 ∈ Ev|e0 →∗ e} is always a global configuration. The
distributed life-cycle of three principals A, B, and C is shown in Fig. 4.1 where dotted vertical line
represents communication point. The progress of principal A in shown in Fig. 4.2.
Using the interpretation structure defined above, the global satisfaction relation at a global
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A
B

e1
e2

e4

C

e3

e5

e7
e6
e6

Figure 4.1: A Distributed Life-cycle for Principals A, B, and C
πA (∅)

αA (e1 )

πA ({e1 })

αA (e4 )

πA ({e1 , e4 })

αA (e7 )

πA ({e1 , e4 , e7 })

Figure 4.2: The Progress of Principal A
configuration ξ of µ can be defined as:
• µ, ξ

@i [φ] if µ, ξ|i

i

φ,

• µ, ξ 2⊥,
• µ, ξ

γ ⇒ δ if µ, ξ 2 γ or µ, ξ

where the local satisfaction relations

δ,

i

at local configurations are defined as:

• µ, ξi

i

act if ξi , ∅ and αi (last(ξi )) = act,

• µ, ξi

i

p if p ∈ πi (ξi ),

• µ, ξi 2i ⊥,
• µ, ξi

i

ϕ ⇒ ψ if µ, ξi 2i ϕ or µ, ξi

• µ, ξi

i

ϕ U ψ if there exists ξi00 ∈ Ξi with ξi

ξi0 ∈ Ξi with ξi
• µ, ξi

i

i

ψ,

ξi0

ξi00 such that µ, ξi00

i

ψ, and µ, ξi0

i

φ for every

ξi such that µ, ξi00

i

ψ, and µ, ξi0

i

φ for every

ξi00 ,

ϕ S ψ if there exists ξi00 ∈ Ξi with ξi00

ξi0 ∈ Ξi with ξi00
• µ, ξi

ξi0

i

ξi , and

j : φ if ξi , ∅, last(ξi ) ∈ Ev j and µ, (last(ξi ) ↓)| j
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j

ϕ.

Table 4.2: Temporal Operators
Operator

Meaning

Operator

Meaning

Xϕ≡⊥Uϕ
Yϕ≡⊥Sϕ
Fϕ≡>Uϕ
Pϕ≡>Sϕ
G ϕ ≡ ¬ F ¬ϕ
H ϕ ≡ ¬ P ¬ϕ

next
previous
sometime in the future
sometime in the past
always in the future
always in the past

†≡ ¬ X >
∗≡¬Y>
Fo ϕ ≡ ϕ ∨ F ϕ
Po ϕ ≡ ϕ ∨ P ϕ
Go ϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ G ϕ
Ho ϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ H ϕ

in the end
in the beginning
now or sometime in the future
now or sometime in the past
now and always in the future
now and always in the past

The interpretation structure µ is called a model of Γ ⊆ L if µ, ξ

γ for every global configuration

ξ of µ and every γ ∈ Γ. Other operators are defined in Table 4.2.
In DTPL, the principals are equipped with two functions synth and analz to compose (through
concatenation2 and encryption) and decompose (through separation and decryption) messages respectively. In particular, if S is a set of messages, then:
The function synth(S ) is the smallest set containing S such that:
If M ∈ synth(S ) and k ∈ synth(S ), then {M}k ∈ synth(S ).
If M1 ∈ synth(S ) and M2 ∈ synth(S ), then M1 M2 ∈ synth(S ).
Similarly, analz(S ) is the smallest set containing S such that:
If {M}k ∈ analz(S ) and k−1 ∈ analz(S ), then M ∈ analz(S ).
If M1 M2 ∈ analz(S ) then M1 ∈ analz(S ) and M2 ∈ analz(S ).
In [CVB05b], a number of axiom schemas have been proposed to represent the specifications
of the communication network. The following axiom schemas represent the notion of perfect
cryptography. That is, knowledge of each principal only depends on his initial knowledge and on
the actions that have occurred.
2

The DTPL uses ; to represent message concatenation. For simplicity, we write AB to represent the concatenation
of the two terms A and B.

55

(K1) @A [knows(M1 M2 ) ⇔ (knows(M1 ) ∧ knows(M2 ))],
(K2) @A [knows(M) ∧ knows(k) ⇒ knows({M}k )],
(K3) @A [knows({M}k ) ∧ knows(k−1 ) ⇒ knows(M)],
(K4) @A [knows(M) ⇒ Go knows(M)],
(K5) @A [rec(M) ⇒ knows(M)],
(K6) @A [spy(M) ⇒ knows(M)],
(K7) @A [nonce(N) ⇒ knows(N)], and
(K8) @A [key(k) ⇒ knows(k)].
The first three axiom schemas state that a principal can separate a concatenated message (K1) and
encrypt or decrypt a message with the known keys (K2, K3). K4 simply says that a principal does
not forget its known messages. K5 through K8 say that a principal knows its received, spied, or
generated (nonces, keys) messages.
The behavior of the channel and the way principals communicate with each other are captured
in terms of the following axiom schemas.
(C1) @Ch [in(M, A) ⇒

W
B∈Princ

B : send(M, A)],

(C2) @Ch [out(M, A) ⇒ P in(M, A)],
(C3) @Ch [out(M, A) ⇒ A : rec(M)],
(P1) @A [send(M, B) ⇒ Y(knows(M) ∧ knows(B))],
(P2) @A [send(M, B) ⇒ Ch : in(M, B)],
(P3) @A [rec(M) ⇒ Ch : out(M, A)]3 ,
(P4) @A [spy(M) ⇒ Ch : (leak ∧ P
3

W
B∈Name

in(M, B))],

In [CVB05a], the channel may output M to any possible aliases used by a principal.
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(P5) @A [

V
B∈Princ\{A}

¬B : >],

(P6) @A [nonce(N) ⇒ ¬Ch : >], and
(P7) @A [key(k) ⇒ ¬Ch : >].
C1 through C3 state that a message arrives at a channel only if it is sent by some principal, that
the channel delivers a message only if it was previously arrived, and that a principal receives a
message if channel delivers it. The axiom schemas P1 through P7 state that a principal must know
the message and the recipient of a sending message (P1), that a sending or a receiving message
must go through the channel (P2, P3), that a spied messages must have been received and leaked by
a channel (P4), that principals do not interact directly (P5), and that nonce and key are not channel
events (P6, P7). Finally, the following axiom schemas capture the freshness and uniqueness of the
nonces respectively:
(N1) @A [nonce(N) ⇒ Y¬knows(MN )], and
(N2) @A [nonce(N)] ⇒

V
B∈Princ\{A}

@B[¬knows(MN )],

where MN ranges over all the messages containing the nonce N. N1 captures freshness of N as a
principal does not know any message containing N before it generates N using nonce action. N2
captures uniqueness of N as at the time N is generated, no principal knows any message containing
N except the one who generated it.

4.2

Developing a Proof-based Verification Framework

In this section, we first describe some of the similarities and the differences in the language of
messages and formulae in SVO and DTPL. We also describe how the messages and formulae in
SVO can be represented in DTPL. Finally, we demonstrate how to benefit from the SVO axioms in
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order to develop a framework in DTPL that can be used to verify authentication protocols. In doing
so, we have tried to refrain from introducing new symbols and constructs into DTPL and used the
existing framework. However, we do introduce some new notions, and the associated symbols and
constructs, either if it was lacking in DTPL or if it considerably simplifies the protocol analysis.
Throughout the discussion, we also give comparative comments at appropriate points on how our
work differs from the SVO [MFG07b].

4.2.1 The language of Messages and formulae
Both approaches use similar primitives to define their language of messages of security protocols.
In particular, SVO assumes the existence of a set T of primitive terms for principal’s names, their
keys and constants. Whereas, DTPL uses finite sets Princ for principal names, Nonce for random
numbers, and Key for keys. Moreover, in the SVO, messages and formulae are built by mutual
induction, whereas DTPL treats messages and atomic propositions separately. In both approaches,
concatenation and encryption on existing messages introduce new messages.
SVO uses primitive proposition constants, some standard operators, and higher-level constructs
(like believe, sees, has) to define formulae. In the DTPL, the principals as well as the channel are
associated with local actions (ActA and ActCh ) and local state propositions (PropA and PropCh )
that contribute towards formula. DTPL also uses temporal operators given in Table 4.2 besides
standard operators. Below we describe how the logical constructs of SVO can be represented in
the DTPL.
• A received X: In SVO, it includes all the received messages plus all the messages that can be
analyzed using X by a principal A. We do not call the analyzed sub-messages of a received
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message X to have been received in DTPL. For example, if {M}k is received by a principal
who possesses k−1 , then we do not call M to be a received message. Instead, we use the
notion of knows along with rec to represent knowing a received message X and extend
knows to all the sub-messages of X, by applying the function analz, that can be analyzed
using X. It seems more intuitive as A did not explicitly receive any of the sub-messages of
X, but knows them by applying the function analz.
• A sees X: It includes all the messages that are received, newly generated, or initially available
to A plus all the messages that A can produce from these messages. In effect, the DTPL’s
actions rec, spy, nonce, key and proposition knows can be collectively used to define the
SVO’s sees as axiomatized in the axioms K1 through K8 excluding K4. Obviously, sees
does not imply future assertions and hence K4 is not catered in sees. If X is restricted to
only keys k, then A has k in SVO can be defined in the similar way.
• A said X: It simply represents that A has sent X at some time in the past. Since DTPL
has a rich set of operators to capture various temporal aspects, it can easily represent such
constructs. In particular, the DTPL’s past time operator P0 on its action send provides similar
effect. Moreover, instead of SVO’s two constructs said and says, we can choose relevant
temporal operator on send in order to provide a precise interpretation of when a message
was exactly said in DTPL.
Now we introduce the following logical constructs into the language of the DTPL.
• f resh(X): Freshness condition in SVO represents what has not been said prior to the current
run of a protocol. Notice that the definition of freshness in SVO provides sufficient condition
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which not only caters the freshness of nonces, but it can also be applied, in general, on any
term. For example, principal’s ids are not generally considered fresh because they were
transmitted to their owners or to other principals at some time in the past (and the SVO’s
definition of freshness holds). However, we argue that this definition of freshness can not
be generalized for any message. Rather, it should be restricted to only atomic terms (like
nonces). For example, according to this definition, provided that an id A and a key k are
not fresh, the message {A}k will still be called fresh just because if nobody ever sent this
message in the past. Since freshness is used to capture, generally with the help of a nonce
or a timestamp, that a message is communicated recently in a protocol, calling {A}k fresh
violates the purpose. Of course, {A}k does not guarantee that a message is fresh. Using
the similar idea, DTPL restricts its definition of freshness to the nonces and adopts a more
conservative approach by assuming that none of the principals know a fresh message before
the time when it was generated.
k

• A ←→ B, PK(A, k): These key association constructs of SVO provide useful information
k

about a principal’s association of certain keys. A ←→ B indicates that k is a key exclusively
shared between A and B whereas PK(A, k) indicates that k is the public-key of A. We extend
the DTPL message structure by adopting key association constructs of SVO. However, we
ψ

change the SVO notation as follows4 . PKψ (A, k) is changed to A 7→ k (for encryption keys),
σ

δ

PKσ (A, k) is changed to A 7→ k (for signature keys), and PKδ (A, k) is changed to A 7→ k
(for key-agreement keys). Moreover, due to the specific nature of these constructs, special
4

It is simply a matter of taste. Instead of using an entirely different notation for public keys (i.e., PK), we find our
modified notation for public-keys 7→ to be closer to the corresponding notation for symmetric-key ←→. BAN also
uses 7→ for public-keys.
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k

x

meaning can be assigned to them. Specifically, A ←→ B or A 7→ k also represent a proposition which can be assigned truth values. That is why, they represent both, messages and
formulae, the proper use of which can be easily understood from the context.
• A controls X: It represents A’s jurisdiction over X. Since it is normally used to mention
authority of a key-server to generate trusted keys, it represents an essential part of authentication protocols. We introduce a proposition controls(X) to represent this feature in DTPL.

4.2.2 The Axioms of the Framework
First, we modify the way DTPL models the communication channel as axiomatized in C1 through
C3. DTPL models a lossy channel which can lose the data without any intruder intervention. Since
our focus is on guaranteeing the security of a protocol with respect to the intruder, we can restrict
ourself to a reliable channel. That is, in the absence of an intruder, messages will reach to their
intended destination. We add the following axioms to capture the reliability of the communication
channel.
(C4) @Ch [in(M, A) ⇒ F(leak ∨ out(M, A))]
(C5) @Ch [leak] ⇒ @A [spy(M)]
By P2, C4, C5, C3, now it is easy to see the following:
(P8) @A [send(M, B)] ⇒

W
P∈Princ

@P [F (spy(M) ∨ rec(M))]

The above axioms state that a channel always transfer the data to a principal, legitimate or otherwise.
DTPL utilizes temporal dimension of knowledge of a principal and does not use the notion of
‘belief’, thereby avoiding confusion caused by different interpretations of the notion of belief in
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previous logics [AT91]. In fact, one of the main contributions of GNY [GNY90] and its successors
(like SVO) was to separate the notion of belief from other notions, like knowing that a shared-key
k

exists between two principals A and B in A ←→ B. Below we describe how we take advantage
from SVO in order to design axioms for our verification framework of DTPL. We have changed
the order in which SVO axioms appear in Section 2.4 in order to obtain continuity of presentation
in this section. We use modus ponens as used by SVO as the only inference rule.
(MP) ϕ ∧ (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ ψ
Since DTPL does not utilize the epistemic properties of its knowledge [CVB05a], the necessitation
rule and the belief axioms 1 through 4 of SVO have not been used in our exposition. Moreover,
due to their importance, the source association axioms of SVO are treated separately in the next
subsection.

4.2.2.1

Possession:

Since the notion of knows in DTPL represents possession in the SVO, all the possession axioms
can be seen in terms of knowledge axioms already described in the previous section. In particular,
Axiom 12 of SVO can be represented by Axiom K5 of DTPL and Axiom 13 of SVO can be easily
derived using Axiom K1 of DTPL as follows.
(K1a) @A [knows(X1 . . . Xn ) ⇒ knows(Xi )] for i = 1, . . . , n.
Similarly, Axiom 14 of SVO is the generalized form of K2 and K3 of DTPL given as follows.
(K2a) @A [knows(X1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ knows(Xn ) ⇒ knows(F(X1 , . . . , Xn ))]
where F represents any function computable by A, e.g. encryption, signature etc.
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4.2.2.2

Receiving:

All the receiving axioms of the SVO can be translated into DTPL using knowledge Axioms K5,
K1 and K3. K5 along with K1a represent Axiom 9 as follows.
@A [rec(X1 . . . Xn ) ⇒ knows(X1 . . . Xn )]
@A [knows(X1 . . . Xn ) ⇒ knows(Xi )] for i = 1, . . . , n
Note that DTPL’s equivalent of SVO’s Axiom 9 is given in terms of knowing the concatenates of a
received concatenated message instead of receiving it. Similarly, receiving an encrypted term such
that a principal holds the corresponding decryption-key means that the principal knows the contents
of the encrypted message. Since we have adopted a richer representation of key association from
SVO, we can break down K3 of DTPL for symmetric-key encryption, public-key encryption, and
signatures as follows.
kAS

(K3a) @A [knows({M}kAS ) ∧ knows(A ←→ S ) ⇒ knows(M)],
ψ

(K3b) @A [knows({M}k ) ∧ knows(A 7→ k) ⇒ knows(M)],
σ

(K3c) @A [knows({M}k−1 ) ∧ knows(B 7→ k) ⇒ knows(M)],
Notice that SVO’s notion of key association not only captures different notions of encryption, but
also provides a clear understanding of knowing the relevant key associated to a principal. For
ψ

example, knowing A 7→ k not only implies the possession of k but also binds it with A. The Axiom
K5 along with K3(a,b,c) give the DTPL representation of Axioms 10 and 11 of the SVO. Although
SVO represents the sub-messages of a received message as being received, we believe that our
adherence to the notion of received messages to only those which are actually received during
communication is more intuitive.
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4.2.2.3

Comprehension and Saying:

The way DTPL models knowledge (K1 through K8), it can not be claimed that a principal A
knows X if he knows F(X). For example, a principal knows a message if he receives it (K5), but
he may not be able to invert F(X) to obtain X. As also mentioned in SVO, its Axiom 15 does
not imply that F is invertible by A. Therefore, we do not use the comprehension axiom of SVO
in DTPL. Moreover, since we do not hold a principal responsible for saying all the concatenates
of a concatenated message, we intentionally remove the saying Axiom 16 in our work. However,
the formula P1 partially represents Axiom 16 in which a principal must know what it says. We do
not have two different temporal constructs for sending a message like SVO’s says and said. Since
we can use past time temporal operators to capture several past time activities, we do away with
Axiom 17 in our work.

4.2.2.4

Freshness:

Since a nonce action nonce(N) in DTPL represents the notion of freshness, we use this action to
introduce a new proposition f resh(N) similar to SVO. In particular, we introduce:
(F1) @A [nonce(N) ⇒ f resh(N)]
The rules N1 and N2 clarify the freshness concept in the DTPL. As used in SVO, a term remains
fresh in the current run of a protocol. That is,
(F1a) @A [ f resh(N) ⇒ X f resh(N)]
Now, we can use Axiom 18 of SVO as follows.
(F2) @A [ f resh(Xi ) ⇒ f resh(X1 . . . Xn )], for i = 1, . . . , n.
It should be noted that f resh(X1 . . . Xn ) means that the entire message X1 . . . Xn is fresh. It may be
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because any of the Xi or all of the Xi are fresh. So given only f resh(X1 . . . Xn ), one can not tell
with certainty that which sub-message is fresh. Similarly, any computable function by A of a fresh
term is also fresh as given by SVO’s Axiom 19.
(F3) @A [ f resh(X1 . . . Xn ) ⇒ f resh(F(X1 , . . . , Xn ))]
For the same reason mentioned above, function F must depend on all of its arguments in order to
guarantee fresh output.

4.2.2.5

Jurisdiction:

Like SVO’s Axiom 20, the following axiom captures the jurisdiction of a principal for generating
keys in DTPL.
(J1) @S [controls(ϕk ) ∧ send(Mk , A)] ⇒

W
P∈Princ

@P [F knows(ϕk )]

That is, if a principal is known to control a formula for generating keys ϕk and he sends a message
containing the key k then the receiver knows ϕk to be true. Of course, the receiver does need to
make sure that S sent Mk before it concludes. By P8, someone will receive Mk and apply J1 to
know ϕk . In order to represent a principal’s jurisdiction over generating keys, we restrict ϕk to be
k

x

of type A ←→ B or A 7→ k (x is the key type in public-key system).

4.2.2.6

Nonce Verification:

The nonce verification axiom of SVO is used to transform the past (said) into present (says) using
the notion of freshness (fresh). DTPL can clearly pin point a past time event using its explicit
notion of configuration. That is why, DTPL introduces only a single action send to represent
sending a message and benefits from its temporal operators to capture the exact timing of the
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event. Therefore, we do not use the nonce verification axiom of SVO.

4.2.2.7

Key Agreement:

These axioms of SVO specifically target the protocols involving a key agreement such as DiffieHellman key exchange. We use the key agreement axiom of SVO in the following.
δ

F0 (kA ,kB )

δ

(K9) @A [knows(A 7→ kA ) ∧ knows(B 7→ kB ) ⇒ knows(A ←→ B)]
Here, F0 is some key-agreement function such that F0 (kA , kB ) = F0 (kB , kA ) = kAB .

4.2.2.8

Symmetric Goodness:

We simply use the symmetric goodness axiom of SVO as follows:
k

k

(G1) @C [knows(A ←→ B) ⇔ knows(B ←→ A)]

4.2.3 Originators of the Received Messages
This subsection is entirely devoted to the source association axioms of SVO because of the key
role they play in verifying authentication in a protocol. Basically source association pertains to
claiming that a message can only be bound to certain source who is responsible for originating
that message. Before we actually translate the source association axioms, we introduce the notion
of ‘origination’. If a principal sends a term in a message such that he never communicated that
term in any message in the past then he originates the term in its sending message. The notion
of origination is not new, but has also been mentioned in the work of strand spaces in [FHG99].
Message origination can be captured with the help of following axiom.

(O1) @A [send(MN , B) ∧ H(¬send(MN0 , C) ∧ ¬rec(MN0 ) ∧ ¬spy(MN0 )) ⇔ Orig(MN )]
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That is, A originates N in M by sending M such that it never communicated any message M 0 that
contained N.
Authentication protocols can be categorized according to different underlying cryptography
used for their implementation. They also utilize different mechanisms to achieve authentication.
The source association axioms in SVO and in others (like BAN, AT, GNY etc.) utilize the same
categorization of authentication protocols. In particular, SVO ascribes two axioms for source association, one for a received message encrypted by a shared-key of two principals, and other for
a received signed message. We briefly mention how authentication protocols can be broadly classified into three categories. We also present our formulation of the source association axioms
according to each category in the following.

4.2.3.1

Symmetric-key Protocols:

Cryptographic protocols often make use of the symmetric-key encryption in order to achieve their
authentication goals. The symmetric-key cryptography has the advantage that an encrypted message contains guarantee about the originator of a received message. That is, an encrypted message
can originate only from the principals having access to the encryption key with which the message
was encrypted. This is a direct consequence of the assumption of ideal cryptography5 . Since in
symmetric-key cryptography, a key is assumed to be a principal’s safe secret, encrypting a message
under symmetric-key ensures the possession of the key, and hence the origination of the message
by a principal having that key. We axiomatize the source association notion of SVO (Axiom 5) as
5

Most of the work in this field is based on this assumption. It simply says that a principal can not encrypt or decrypt
a message without having the proper encryption or decryption key.
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follows.
k

(O2) @A [knows(P ←→ Q) ∧ rec({X}k )] ⇒

_

@B [P Orig({X}k )]

B∈{P,Q}

Since A knows the key k, generally A is either P or Q in the above axiom. Moreover, if a server
generated the key k for P and Q, then A may also represent the server. Since a server never encrypts
a message with the shared key of principals, B does not represent the server. Notice that the above
formula captures the possibility of a message originated by both principals possessing the key k.
This distinguishes our formalization of the notion of source association from others. SVO assumes
that a principal can recognize any message that it has seen before using its notion of recognizability
in hXi∗C . Therefore, it restricts its attention to only those messages that are known to be coming
form a principal other than him by adding f rom with the received message in its axiom, that is,
C received{X f rom B}k in Axiom 5. We make no such assumptions. Our axiomatization captures
those situations also in which a principal’s own originated message is redirected back to him in
order to launch an attack. See [GF02] for such an attack on Woo-Lam one-way authentication
protocol [WL92]. However, we do assume that A is able to distinguish X from any garbage value.
This is necessary, otherwise, after decrypting any garbage value Y (Y = {X}k ), A would not know if
the content of Y, i.e. X, was really encrypted with k or was just a random bitstream. Moreover, note
that we do not need to include DTPL equivalent of B has X (i.e. knows(X)) in the consequence
of the above rule as done in Axiom 5 of SVO, because according to P1, B already knows what it
sends.
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4.2.3.2

Asymmetric-key Protocols

In asymmetric-key cryptography, a signed message originates from a principal who has access to
the private-key with which the message was signed. We assume the private-key of a principal to be
its safe secret. Since principal’s ids are unique and their mapping to the private-keys are injective
in asymmetric cryptography, signing a message by a principal’s private-key assures the originator
of the signed message. The asymmetric-key equivalent of the SVO source association Axiom 6
can be given as:

σ

(O3) @A [knows(B 7→ k) ∧ rec({X}k−1 )] ⇒ @B [P Orig({X}k−1 )]

We have avoided using the extra notation introduced in SVO as in the above axiom it is assumed
that applying k to {X}k−1 confirms that {X}k−1 is the results of signing X with the private-key k−1 .
Similarly, we avoided using separate notations for encryption and signing as it can be simply
understood from the syntax ({X}k represents an encrypted message whereas {X}k−1 represents a
signed message).

4.2.3.3

Challenge-response Protocols

This is the last category that we use to identify the originator of a received message. None of
the methods provide any axiom for this category in the entire BAN suite. This is because in the
protocols using public-key cryptography, an encrypted message does not provide any guarantee in
the identity of its sender. The reason being the obvious fact that anyone can encrypt a message
masquerading someone else by using public-key of the intended recipient. That is why, we use
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a challenge-response strategy that public-key protocols typically rely on in which they use an
encrypted secret in their challenge messages in order to achieve authentication (for example, the
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [NS78]). If a nonce or a pre-shared secret in an encrypted
message is used as a challenge, the correct response may be to generate a reply containing that
nonce or the secret. It ensures that the challenge is not only received by the intended principal but
it also opened (decrypted) the challenge message in order to retrieve the secret and composed a
reply. The challenger may need to check the structure of reply message to ensure that an intruder
has not simply forwarded the challenge message back to the challenger [MFG06b].
Since public-key encryption does not provide any information regarding source association,
ψ

B 7→ k can not be directly used in the source association axiom. We use the above challengeresponse idea to identify the originator of a received message in public-key protocols as follows.
If N is a fresh secret uniquely originated in an encrypted challenge message {MN }k such that only
a principal B has the corresponding private-key to obtain N from {MN }k , then the reception of a
message having N in any form other than {MN }k ensures that B knows {MN }k , decrypted it and
released N in any form other than {MN }k . The intuition is that since only B has the decryption key
to discover N from {MN }k and N is originated uniquely (so that no other principal knows N except
the one who originated it), reception of any message in which N occurs in any form other than
{MN }k confirms that {MN }k has been decrypted and the information has been released by B. The
idea of treating security protocols as challenge-response protocols is not new. For example, similar
idea has been presented, not in the logic-based setting though, in the authentication tests of strand
spaces in [GF02].
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ψ

(O4)@A [(¬send(MN0 , C) S (Orig({MN }k ) ∧ f resh(N))) ∧ rec(MN00 ) ∧ knows(B 7→ k)]

⇒

@B [P (Orig(MN000 ) ∧ P knows({MN }k ))]

where, N must exist in MN00 in a form other than {MN }k . Moreover, N also exists in MN000 in a form
other than {MN }k . The above axiom is the generalized form of the challenge-response based on
public-key encryption. The condition that N must exist in MN00 in a form other than {MN }k guards
against the attack where an intruder simply forwards {MN }k back to A without involving B at all.
Therefore, if this condition is met, B must have received and decrypted {MN }k and released N in
any form other than {MN }k in MN000 .
So far, we have presented the extended DTPL framework that can be used to analyze authentication protocols in a proof-based environment. Next, we present how to apply the proposed
framework in order to analyze a protocol.
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATIONS

5.1 Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Secret-Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol [BAN90] is a well-known protocol that has influenced the design of many authentication protocols (for example, Kerberos protocol developed at
MIT was based on it [MNS]). We analyze its authentication property using the proposed axioms.

5.1.1 The Protocol Description
The Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol is depicted in Fig 5.1. The goal of this protocol
is to distribute a session key kAB from a trusted server S to two principals A and B. Principals
already possess secret shared-keys (kAS and kBS ) with the server. Na and Nb are the nonces of A
and B respectively. The protocol begins by A, the initiator, sending its request to S in the first
message. Upon receiving the first message, the server generates a session key kAB and sends the
second message to A. The initiator A extracts the relevant information and forwards the encrypted
sub-message of its message to B. Upon receiving the message, B, the responder, generates a nonce

B

A

S
ABNa
{Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS

{kAB A}kBS
{Nb }kAB
{Nb − 1}kAB
Figure 5.1: Needham Schroeder Shared-key (NSSK) Protocol.
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ξ1

ξ2

ξ3

ξ4

rec({Nb }kAB )
nonce(Na )
rec({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS )
e2
e3
e4
e5
A e1
send({kAB A}kBS , B)
send(ABNa , S)
Ch

ξ5
send({Nb − 1}kAB , B)
e6

out({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS , A)
in(ABNa , S)

out({Nb }kAB , A)
in({kAB A}kBS , B)
in({Nb − 1}kAB , B)

Figure 5.2: Life-cycle of Principal A in NSSK Protocol.
and encrypts it with the received session key and sends it to A. Finally, A replies B back in the last
message. A subtracts 1 from B’s nonce in order to differentiate the last two messages.

5.1.2 The Initiator’s Perspective
We begin by analyzing the protocol from the initiator’s perspective. The initiator’s sequence of
messages can be represented in terms of DTPL as follows.
1. @A [send({nB − 1}kAB , B) ∧ P (rec({nB }kAB ) ∧ P (send({kAB A}kBS , B)
∧ P (rec({NA BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS ) ∧ P (send(ABNA , S ) ∧ P nonce(Na )))))]
In the above, Y could be used instead of the past time operator P, but we stick to the the representation given in [CVB05a]. The life-cycle of initiator A is depicted in Fig. 5.2. Notice the vertical
dashed lines in the figure indicating different configuration points in the run of the initiator. Each
event ei corresponding to each action of the initiator of the protocol changes A’s configuration from
ξi−1 to ξi .
The initial set of assumptions related to principal A is as follows:
kAS

@A [∗ ⇒ knows(A ←→ S )]
kAS

@S [∗ ⇒ knows(A ←→ S )]
where ∗ (see Table 4.2) captures initial configuration of a principal for this protocol. Knowledge is
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treated in DTPL as non-decreasing as formulated by K4. This monotonicity has been adopted by
several researchers, such as BAN and its successors, where they treated belief as non-decreasing.
We apply MP and K4 and use the above assumptions to get the following results at any configuration.
kAS

A1. @A [knows(A ←→ S )]
kAS

A2. @S [knows(A ←→ S )]
Similarly, we also assume the server’s authority for generating session keys.
k

A3. @S [controls(A ←→ B)]
Applying O2, A1, A2, 1, and MP at configuration ξ3 :
2. @Q [P Orig({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS )]
where Q ∈ {A, S } originates the above message at ξ ⊂ ξ3 (capturing ‘sometime in the past’). Since
a principal originating a message sends that message to some principal C, using O1, MP, and 2 at
ξ:
3. @Q [send({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS , C)]
For this protocol to work properly, notice that Q should be actually the server S and not the principal A. But in our case, Q ∈ {A, S }. So in order to check the possibility if Q = A, we use a fairly
straight forward method. We generalize the message by focusing on abstract message structure in
the protocol without instantiating any message variable to any particular value. That is, Q sends
{NYk{kX}k1 }k2 (here, N is a nonce, X and Y are principal ids, and k, k1 , and k2 are keys). We simply
analyze all the sending events of principal A. We do not check the server because that what we are
trying to prove. Examining all the actions corresponding to sending events and using the assumption of message algebra freeness, it is easy to realize that none of the sending action has a message
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corresponding to {NYk{kX}k1 }k2 . Therefore, we remove the possibility that a message of this form
is sent by any principal except S . Therefore, Q is in fact equal to S . From now on, we replace Q
by S .
Since S must know its sending message before sending it. According to P1, MP, and 3 at a
configuration ξ0 = ξ\last(ξ) (capturing ‘previous’ Y in P1).
4. @S [knows({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS )]
Therefore, S having the decryption key also knows the contents of the encrypted term. Using K3a,
A2, MP, and 4 at ξ0 :
5. @S [knows(Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS )]
Since A received {Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS at ξ3 (from 1) and knows the corresponding key (from A1),
it knows the encrypted message as well as its contents. From K5, 1, and MP at ξ3 :
6. @A [knows({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS )]
From K3a, A1, MP and 6 at ξ3 :
7. @A [knows(Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS )]
Using K1a, 7 and MP:
8. @A [knows({kAB A}kBS )]
Note that A’s knowing {kAB A}kBS does not mean knowing its content because A does not possess
the key kBS . Therefore, {kAB A}kBS appears as arbitrary term to A. From the analysis so far, it can be
deduced that the server is familiar with the initiator’s nonce and the responder’s id and generated
kAB . Now using F1, 1, and MP at ξ1 :
9. @A [nonce(Na ) ⇒ f resh(Na )]
From N1 and N2 at ξ1 , we can say that no principal ever knew any message before ξ1 containing
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Na as its subterm. Using F2, 9, and MP:
10. @A [ f resh(Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS )]
and from F3, 10, and MP:
11. @A [ f resh({Na BkAB {kAB A}kBS }kAS )]
Therefore, from A’s perspective, the server not only generated kAB , but it generated it freshly.
Furthermore, A also deems kAB as the right session key to be used between him and B as stated by
J1, 3, A3, and MP:
kAB

12. @A [knows(A ←→ B)]
So far we have established A’s understanding from the message exchanges between him and the
server. Now we examine the interaction between principals A and B from the initiator’s perspective.
A sends {kAB A}kBS to B at ξ4 and receives {Nb }kAB at ξ5 . Using R2, 1 and MP at ξ5 :
13. @A [knows({Nb }kAB )]
Notice that here we can not apply the origination formula for symmetric keys because even if A
decrypts {Nb }kAB , it can not recognize Nb , violating the assumption in O2. From K3a, 13, 12, and
MP at ξ5 :
14. @A [knows(Nb )]
Since A had no knowledge of Nb before this point in time and there is no extra information in the
message {Nb }kAB that may help A recognize the correctness of this message, A can not conclude
anything further. That is, even though A possesses kAB and is able to extract Nb from its received
message {Nb }kAB , it can not tell if the nonce Nb is actually the responder’s nonce or any garbage
value. This suggests a possible weakness in the protocol where an intruder could simply replace
{Nb }kAB by any random value X. As long as A does not recognize X (using any other means) as
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ξ1

B

Ch

ξ2
nonce(Nb )
e2

rec({kAB A}kBS )
e1

ξ3
send({Nb }kAB , A)
e3

ξ4
rec({Nb − 1}kAB )
e4

in({Nb }kAB , A)
out({Nb − 1}kAB , B)

out({kAB A}kBS , B)

Figure 5.3: Life-cycle of Principal B in NSSK Protocol.
an improper message, the intruder can successfully make A feel that it has completed the protocol
with B whereas B may not have been involved in the protocol at all. This is because we have not
assumed that a principal can tell where a message is coming from by just looking at the structure
of the message. That is why, A could not recognize Nb from the message {Nb }kAB . It should be
obvious by now that this problem can be resolved by simply adding in the second last message
something that A can recognize, such as B’s id. This problem and the corresponding solution was
first suggested in [GNY90]. This concludes our analysis of the protocol from the initiator’s side.
Next, we analyze the protocol from the responder’s perspective.

5.1.3 The Responder’s Perspective
The responder’s life cycle is depicted in Fig. 5.3. The responder’s sequence of actions can be
written as:
1. @B [rec({NB − 1}kAB ) ∧ P(send({NB }kAB , A) ∧ P(nonce(Nb ) ∧ P rec({kAB A}kBS )))]
The initial set of assumptions is as follows:
kBS

kBS

@B [∗ ⇒ knows(B ←→ S )] and @S [∗ ⇒ knows(B ←→ S )].
By MP, K4, and the above assumptions:
kBS

A1. @B [knows(B ←→ S )]
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kBS

A2. @S [knows(B ←→ S )]
k

A3. @S [controls(A ←→ B)]
From O2, A1, A2, 1, and MP at ξ1 :
2. @Q [P Orig({kAB A}kBS )]
Here, Q ∈ {B, S }. Using the similar reason as given before and assuming that the message algebra
is freely generated, it can be seen that none of the B’s sending actions correspond to a message of
the form {kX}k0 . Therefore, from O1, MP, and 2 at ξ ⊂ ξ1 :
3. @S [send({kAB A}kBS , C)]
From P1, MP, and 3 at ξ0 = ξ\last(ξ)
4. @S [knows({kAB A}kBS )]
From K3a, A2, MP, and 4 at ξ0 :
5. @S [knows(kAB A)]
From K5, 1, and MP at ξ1 :
6. @B [knows({kAB A}kBS )]
From K3a, A1, MP and 6 at ξ1 :
7. @B [knows(kAB A)]
Therefore, the responder is aware of the session key originated by the server. Note that unlike
the initiator, B can not gain any assurance in the freshness of its received message. Therefore,
from B’s perspective, although the server has generated kAB , it may not have generated it freshly.
Therefore, examining the protocol from the responder’s perspective also reveals a vulnerability to
a known replay attack. If an attacker records one run of this protocol and subsequently learns the
key kAB , he can replay the message {kAB A}kBS to B. Being unable to tell that the key kAB is not fresh,
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B will accept it as a legitimate request to initiate a session using that key. The authors of BAN
in [BAN90] mentioned this vulnerability in the protocol. That is why, BAN had to resort to the
kAB

dubious assumption that B believes f resh A ←→ B in order to attain authentication.
B also considers kAB as the right session key to be used between him and A as stated by J1, 3,
A3, and MP:
kAB

8. @B [knows(A ←→ B)]
By F1, 1, and MP at ξ2 :
9. @B [nonce(Nb ) ⇒ f resh(Nb )]
By F3, 9, and MP:
10. @B [ f resh({Nb }kAB )]
11. @B [ f resh({Nb − 1}kAB )]
B receives {Nb − 1}kAB at ξ4 . Since A can recognize Nb − 1, by O2, 8, 1, and MP at ξ ⊂ ξ4 :
12. @A [Orig({Nb − 1}kAB )]
Since Nb , Nb − 1 (free message algebra), B could not have originated the above message. Therefore, assuming that the session key kAB is fresh, the responder of the protocol guarantees that the
initiator shares the same session key with him.
The purpose of the protocol was to distribute a session key between both principals. But analyzing the protocol from the initiator’s perspective reveals that the initiator is not sure if the responder
also possesses the session key at the end of the protocol. Furthermore, the responder is not sure
that it shares the fresh session-key with the initiator until it assumes that kAB is always freshly
generated.
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5. {Kserv C}kS {CtC sreq }Kserv

K

2. C{Kauth C}kT {Kauth n1 T }kC
3. {Kauth C}kT {C}Kauth CSn2

4. C{Kserv C}kS {Kserv n2 S}Kauth
T
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Figure 5.4: Message Exchanges Between the Client C and the Servers K, T, and S in the Kerberos
protocol.
5.2 Analyzing Public-Key Extension of Kerberos-5
PKINIT is the public-key extension of Kerberos 5 authentication protocol. First we briefly overview
Kerberos 5 and give motivation behind PKINIT.

5.2.1 The Protocol Description
Kerberos [NYH05], [NT94] is a widely deployed protocol designed to authenticate clients to multiple networked services using a single login. Messages in the Kerberos contain various encrypted
tickets that are used to authenticate a user to the desired service. The recent version of Kerberos,
Kerberos 5, is available for all major operating systems. A standard run of Kerberos 5 consists
of three phases. A client C first obtains a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from kerberos authentication server (KAS) K. C then presents TGT to ticket granting server (TGS) T and obtains a service
ticket (ST). Finally C uses the service ticket to authenticate itself to an application server S. Kerberos message exchanges are depicted in Fig. 5.4. For simplicity, we omit some of the message
ingredients from the protocol that essentially do not affect the analysis at hand.
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Client

1. Ccert {tC n2 }K −1 CT n1

KAS

C

C

K

2. {Kcert {kn2 }K −1 }KC CTtgt {Kauth n1 tK T }k
K

Figure 5.5: The First Round of Message Exchanges Between a Client C and the Kerberos Authentication Server K in PKINIT Protocol.
In Figure 5.4, {KauthC}kT = ticket granting ticket T tgt (in message 2) and {K servC}kS = service
ticket T st (in message 4) Moreover, kC , kT , kS are the secret keys of C, T, and S respectively. n1 ,n2
are two distinct nonces and Kauth and K serv are the authentication-key to be shared between C and
T and the service-key to be shared between C and S respectively.
Notice that upon receiving each message, the client C creates an authenticator to be used for the
next message exchange. The client uses {C}Kauth and {CtC sreq }K serv as authenticators in the third and
fifth message exchanges. The last message exchange {tC sreq }K serv is an acknowledgment message
from the server and is optional. PKINIT [IET05] is an extension to the basic protocol in which
public-key authentication is used in the first pass of the protocol. The next two passes in PKINIT
remain the same as that in Kerberos 5. In Kerberos 5, KAS derives the long-term shared secret kC
from the user’s password. This leaves KAS vulnerable to attacks where even read-only access to
KAS may result in the compromised secret keys of the clients. With the introduction of public-key
cryptography, PKINIT does not need shared secret between a client and KAS, hence avoids the
possibility of compromised long-term shared secrets. Since public-key cryptography is computationally expensive operation, PKINIT uses it only in its first pass of the protocol. However, it
complicates the overall protocol since the rest of the passes use traditional secret-key cryptography.
An abstract view of the first round of message exchanges in PKINIT can be represented as shown
in Fig. 5.5.
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In its first pass, the client forwards his certificate Ccert along with a timestamp tC and a nonce
n2 signed by his private-key kC−1 . Client’s certificate provides the information about client’s publickey to KAS and the signed message affirms that it has been originated at the client. Client also
concatenates its id C, the ticket granting server’s id T and a nonce n1 in the first message. KAS
replies the client back with its certificate Kcert and a signed message containing a freshly generated
symmetric-key k and the client’s nonce n2 , all encrypted with the public-key of the client kC .
Both the certificates Ccert and Kcert are provided by public-key infrastructure (PKI) that ensures
binding of public-keys to the users. The reply message also contains the ticket T tgt and a message
containing the authentication key Kauth , nonce n1 , timestamp tK , and TGS id T, all encrypted by the
fresh key k.

5.2.2 Analyzing the Protocol
We briefly sketch the analysis of the first pass of PKINIT that uses public-key cryptography. We
apply the aforementioned axioms of the framework in order to investigate the messages from each
principal’s perspective. In other words, the initiator C investigates its sent and received messages
in order to find out the true responder K of the protocol. Similarly, the responder tries to find out
the true initiator of the protocol by investigating its message [MFG07a]. We assume that only
principals C and K possess the secret keys kC−1 and k−1
K respectively and the nonces are distinct
(n1 , n2 ) and uniquely originating. That is, a nonce can not be originated by more than one
principal. Notice that n2 serves as an open challenge to KAS in the first message. Client waits for
the right response before proceeding to the second round of the protocol. That is, it waits for a
signed message of the form {kn2 }k−1
. The C’s and K’s runs of the first phase of the protocol are
K
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in(M1 , K)
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Figure 5.6: First Pass of the Client’s Run in PKINIT Using DTPL (The client C sends its challenge
n2 and expects a message containing n2 singed by the private-key of K.)
ξ10
KAS

Channel

ξ20
rec(M1 )
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key(K)
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nonce(n1 )

out(M1 , K)

ξ50
send(M2 , C)

in(M2 , C)

Figure 5.7: First Pass of the KAS ’s Run in PKINIT Using DTPL (The server K responds to the
client’s challenge by sending a singed message containing n2 along with a session key k.)
depicted in terms of DTPL in Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 respectively.
Corresponding to the above figures, the client’s and server’s sequence of messages can be
represented in terms of DTPL as follows.
1. @C [rec(M2 ) ∧ P (send(M1 , K) ∧ P nonce(n2 ))]
2.@K [send(M2 , C) ∧ P (nonce(n1 ) ∧ P(key(k) ∧ Prec(M1 )))]
Where, M1 = Ccert {tC n2 }kC−1 CT n1 and M2 = {Kcert {kn2 }k−1
}kC CT tgt {Kauth n1 tK T }k .
K
Notice the vertical dashed lines in the figures indicating various configurations in the run of
a principal. Moreover, vertical dotted lines represent communication points between a principal
and the distributed channel. DTPL defines a distributed channel in which a principal’s sending and
receiving actions are directly linked with the channel’s in(M,A) and out(M,A) actions respectively.
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Since our framework focuses solely on the actions of the principals of a protocol, we ignore the
channel in the figures. Also notice that each action (send, rec, nonce, key) of a principal changes
its configuration from ξi to ξi+1 .
The initial set of assumptions of the principals is as follows:
@C [∗ =⇒ knows(K 7→ kK )], @K [∗ =⇒ knows(C 7→ kC )], @C [∗ =⇒ knows(C 7→ kC )]
0

Where, * captures initial configurations ξ1 and ξ 1 for C and K respectively. More assumptions
can be written, such as K knows its own public-key, which we do not need in the present analysis.
Knowledge is treated in DTPL as non-decreasing as formulated by K2. We apply MP and K2 and
use the above assumptions to get the following results at any configuration.
A1. @C [knows(K 7→ kK )]
A2. @K [knows(C 7→ kC )]
A3. @C [knows(C 7→ kC )]
The server K investigates it messages and concludes the following.
0

3. @K [rec({tC n2 }−1
kC )] by 2, C1 and MP at ξ 2 .
0

4. @K [rec(tC n2 )] by 3, A2, C4 and MP at ξ 2 .
0

5. @K [rec(n2 )] by 4, C1 and MP at ξ 2 .
0

6. @K [knows(n2 )] by 5, C5 and MP at ξ 2 .
0

7. @C [P Orig({tC n2 }kC−1 )] by 3, O3, A2 and MP at ξ 2 .
Therefore, the kerberos authentication server K knows that C initiated the session and origi0

nated the nonce at sometime before ξ 2 . Now the client C investigates it messages in the following.
8. @C [rec({Kcert {kn2 }kν−1 }kC )] by 1, C1 and MP at ξ4 .
9. @C [rec(Kcert {kn2 }kν−1 )] by 8, C3, A3 and MP at ξ4 .
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10. @C [rec({kn2 }kν−1 )] by 9, C1and MP at ξ4 .
11. @C [rec(kn2 )] by 10, C4 and MP at ξ4 .
12. @C [rec(n2 )] by 11, C1 and MP at ξ4 .
The client has received back its nonce n2 which it generated as a challenge for K. Furthermore,
13. @K [P Orig({kn2 }kν−1 )] by 10, O3, A1 and MP at ξ4 .
The client concludes that K has originated the signed message sometime before ξ4 . In addition
to the above, the client carries out the following analysis based on freshness and concludes that it
has been involved in the current run of the protocol.
14. @C [ f resh(n2 )] by 1, F1 and MP at ξ2 .
15. @C [ f resh(n2 )] by 14, F2 and MP at ξ ⊃ ξ2 .
16. @C [ f resh(M2 )] by 15, F3 and MP at ξ4 .
That is, the client C provides assurance in the origination of its fresh nonce n2 by signing it with
ensures the origination
its secret key kC−1 . The presence of n2 in the received signed message {kn2 }k−1
K
of the message and hence the reception of n2 at KAS. Other than that, the client does not provide
any assurance in the rest of the message bindings with the legitimate KAS. This results in the
lack of assurance in some crucial parameters from client’s view of kerberos authentication server.
Apart from the signed message in M2 , {kn2 }k−1
, binding it with the KAS, public-key encryption in
K
{Kcert {kn2 }k−1
}kC using kC and symmetric-key encryption in {Kauth n1 tK T }k using k do not bind the
K
messages with its recipient - the client C. That is, simply from M2 it can not be deduced that the
server K is aware of the client C for this session of the protocol. This is due to the fact that n2 could
be easily obtained from M1 and any principal could encrypt a message with the public-key of C in
M2 . Moreover, a principal could simply forward {Kauth n1 tK T }k after receiving it first from KAS.
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2. Pcert {tC n2 }K −1 P T n1

1. Ccert {tC n2 }K −1 CT n1

P

C

C

P

K

4. {Kcert {kn2 }K −1 }KC CTtgt {Kauth n1 tK T }k
K

3. {Kcert {kn2 }K −1 }KP P Ttgt {Kauth n1 tK T }k
K

Figure 5.8: Attack on PKINIT in Which a Penetrator Plays Man-in-the-middle Between C and K.
5.2.3

Attack on the Protocol

The above-mentioned lack of assurance in parameter C in the message component {kn2 }k−1
results
K
in the man-in-the-middle attack. The authors in [?] were the first to mention this attack on PKINIT26. The attack, somewhat similar to that on the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol in [?],
exploits the above-mentioned weakness in the protocol in which ids of the principals are not tightly
bound with the messages. Fig. 5.8 shows how it works.
Observe that the penetrator P captures C’s message and makes some changes such that it appears to KAS as if it was generated by P. Given that P is a legitimate principal of the network,
KAS follows the standard protocol step and comes up with k, Kauth and tK . The reply from KAS is
intended for P but the reply message does not contain any binding to ensure KAS’s perception of
the initiator. Apart from the message component {kn2 }KK−1 , rest of the message can be constructed
for any legitimate principal. Notice that T tgt contains the id of the initiator as perceived by KAS
(P in this case) but C can not decrypt T tgt and never learns this information. This attack in the
initial phase of the protocol propagates to the remaining two phases in which the client contacts
TGS and the server. Every time the client initiates a request with one of the servers, P intercepts
the messages and forges them such that the servers believe the messages to be originated by the
penetrator P. In particular, P’s possession of Kauth (and hence K serv ) makes it possible to replace
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client’s authenticators with that of the penetrator’s authenticators. Client’s inability to read T tgt and
T st results in the successful completion of the protocol run.
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CHAPTER 6
EXTENDING THE DISTRIBUTED TEMPORAL PROTOCOL LOGIC

After a protocol is represented in terms of DTPL, we investigate a participant’s life-cycle using
the challenge-response strategy. The analysis proceeds by first identifying the challenge generated
by a participant in its life-cycle and then assuring that the reply message correctly represents the
response to that challenge.
In order to achieve authentication goal, a variety of authentication protocols have been proposed in the literature. They can be broadly categorized according to the cryptographic approach
taken (symmetric-key or public-key), numbers of trusted third parties to carry out some agreed
function, and the type of authentication (one-way or two-way authentication) desired [CJ97]. We
posit that irrespective of their particular implementation, authentication protocols follow a common challenge-response criterion in which a participant generates a challenge and waits for the
proper reply. A correct reply convinces the challenger that authentication is achieved from its side
of the protocol.
Authentication protocols employ different underlying cryptography and utilize several mechanisms to achieve authentication. For instance, some protocols use a nonce as a challenge (for example, the Needham-Schroeder public-key [NS78], the Andrew Secure RPC Handshake [Sat87],
and the Otway-Rees [OR87] protocols) whereas others use a pre-shared secret (for example, the
802.11i protocol [IEE04]) to generate a challenge. If a nonce or a pre-shared secret in an encrypted
message is used as a challenge, the correct response may be to generate a reply containing that
nonce or the secret. It ensures that the challenge is not only received by the intended participant
but it also opened (decrypted) the challenge message in order to retrieve the secret and composed a
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reply. The challenger may need to check the structure of reply message to ensure that a penetrator
has not simply forwarded its challenge message back to him. We will further elaborate on this
issue in the rest of the document. In other cases where the nonce is not encrypted in the challenge
message, the correct reply may be to construct a message containing the nonce and encrypted by
the key only possessed by the legitimate responder. Nonces, timestamps, or sequence numbers
also serve as a notion of freshness in many protocols [MFG06a].
The type of cryptography used by a protocol also heavily influence how the protocol implements its challenge-response strategy. For instance, in the protocols using public-key cryptography, an encrypted message does not provide any guarantee in the identity of its sender. The reason
being the obvious fact that anyone can compose a message masquerading someone else by using public-key of the intended recipient. That is why, public-key protocols typically rely on an
encrypted secret in their challenge messages in order to achieve authentication (for example, the
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol). Nevertheless, a signed message in public-key system
ensures the originator of the message because the private-key of a participant is assumed to be
its safe secret (for example, the Diffie-Helman key agreement in TLS protocol [DA99]). In the
similar vein, the symmetric-key cryptography has the advantage that an encrypted message contains guarantee about the originator of the message. Therefore, the challenge does not have to be
a secret any more. Rather, any random number or a timestamp can be sent as a challenge to the
intended recipient, even in an un-encrypted form (for example, the Neuman-Stubblebine [NS93]
and the Woo-Lam [WL92] protocols).1 The correct reply should be a message encrypted under the
symmetric-key containing the fresh challenge. Existence of a freshly generated random number or
1

This is not always the case though. For instance, the Otway-Rees protocol uses symmetric-key cryptography and
still encrypts its challenge messages.
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Figure 6.1: An Abstract Authentication Protocol
a timestamp simply ensures that the participants do not become victims of replay attacks in which
a penetrator reuses a message from a previous run of the protocol [MFG06b].

6.1 The Analysis Steps
So far we have given a brief account on how security protocols can be seen in terms of a high-level
challenge-response protocols. Now we use the above-mentioned concepts and describe our proposed strategy for analyzing cryptographic protocols. We take an abstract protocol and describe
the important phases involved in its analysis.

Phase 1. Protocol Representation: As mentioned before, we use the DTPL’s event structures to
represent a protocol. Authentication protocols often comprise of two or more participants sending/receiving messages to/from each other. An abstract view of an authentication protocol is shown
in the Fig. 6.1. Notice that each participant’s life cycle can have a different length. That is, i is
not necessarily equal to j in ei and e0j in Fig. 6.1. Moreover, events correspond to the actions from
send, rec, spy, nonce, and key. The communication events such as (e2 , e02 ) represent (send, rec)
pair. After a protocol is represented in terms of distributed life-cycles, each participant is analyzed
separately.

Phase 2. Identifying the Challenge and Response: In this step, we focus on a participant’s life90

cycle and identify the parameter n used as a challenge by that participant. Lets assume that the
participant is playing as an initiator Init in the protocol. Assuming that n is fresh, we ascertain if
n is originating at Init. To ensure that n is originating in a message Mc , the following conditions
need to be checked:
• Init contains an event such that α(ei ) = send(Mc , A).
• n ∈ subterm(Mc ).
• n < subterm(M) such that α(ek ) ∈ {send(M, A), rec(M), spy(M)} lies in the local life-cycle
of Init, where 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1.
Assuming n to be uniquely originating (that is, it does not originate at any participant except Init),
identify the expected response of the protocol at Init. In addition to having the intended structure
of the response message, correct response Mr should observe the following conditions:
• Init contains an event e j such that j > i.
• α(e j ) = rec(Mr ).
• n ∈ subterm(Mr ).
• n lies as a new component in Mr .
Generally either the challenge message Mc contains n in the encrypted form discernable to only
legitimate participants, or the response message Mr is in a form that can only be constructed by
a legitimate participant. In either case, we need that the last condition hold. That is, n lies as a
new component in Mr to assure that the response message is not a result of simply replaying the
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challenge message.

Phase 3. Finding the Originator of the Response: Once the challenge and the response at a
participant are identified, we investigate the originator of the response. In order to find the true
originator of a response, following observations are made:
• In asymmetric-key cryptography, a signed message originates from the participant who has
access to the private-key with which the message was signed. We assume the private-key of
a participant to be its safe secret. Since participant’s ids are unique and their mapping to the
private-keys are injective in asymmetric cryptography, signing a message by a participant’s
private-key assures the originator of the signed message.
• In symmetric-key cryptography, an encrypted message can originate only from the participants having access to the encryption key with which the message was encrypted. This
is a direct consequence of the assumption of ideal cryptography. Since in symmetric-key
cryptography, a key is assumed to be a participant’s safe secret, encrypting a message under
symmetric-key ensures the possession of the key, and hence the origination of the message
by a participant having that key.
• If n is a fresh secret uniquely originated in an encrypted challenge message Mc at a participant such that only a participant P has the key to decrypt Mc and obtain n, and Mr is the
correct response, then the reception of Mr ensures its origination at P.
In the above, we have simply discussed the rationale behind the observations. We give formal representation for finding the originator of a message in terms of distributed temporal protocol logic
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in the next section. Most of the formal frameworks use similar reasoning to find the originator of a
received message, see [BAN90, GNY90, MFG06c, FHG99] for example. Observing the aforementioned challenge-response strategy followed by a broad range of cryptographic protocols, notice
that these points suffice our purpose of analyzing the protocols at a higher level of abstraction. We
elaborate this notion further along with an example in the rest of the document.
As a result of applying the above-mentioned observations, if only the intended participant
specified by the protocol is identified as the originator of the response message, we proceed with
the next step. But if the response message could have been originated by any participant Pi other
than the one specified by the protocol, we examine the life-cycle of each such participant Pi in
order to find out the event responsible for originating the response M. In particular, for each Pi :
• For all the events in the life-cycle of Pi , find an event ei such that α(ei ) = send(Mr , B), M ∈
subterm(Mr ) and M < subterm(M 0 ) in an event ek , α(ek ) ∈ {send(M 0 , A), rec(M 0 ), spy(M 0 )},
where 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1.
• Existence of such event suggests possible attack on the protocol.
Phase 4. Matching the Parameters: Successful identification of the originator of the response
message ensures the reception of the challenge message at the responder. This results into agreement in the parameters of the challenge message between the challenger and the responder. As
suggested by Lowe [Low97], we check if the agreeing parameters include critical values such as
the ids, nonces, and other secret variables used in the protocol. Lack of parameter matching in any
of the critical values suggests possible security hole resulting into successful man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack.
93

Protocol Input
Identify the
challenge/response
α(ei ) = send(Mc , A)

Phase 1 DTPL representation

Find the originator
of the response

ei
Phase 2

α(ej ) = rec(Mr )

e0i

ej

α(e0i ) = rec(Mc )

Phase 3
e0j α(e0 ) = send(Mr , B)
j
MITM

Phase 4
Matching
parameters

MITM

Figure 6.2: Phases of Our Proposed Method (Here the challenge term n ∈ subterm(Mc ) and n ∈
subterm(Mr ).)
An abstract view of the phases of overall analysis is shown in Fig. 6.2. As mentioned before, finding the unintended originator of a received message either directly at phase 3 or through
discovering the mismatched parameter at phase 4 results into a successful MITM attack.

6.2 Originator of a Received Message
Based on different categories of authentication protocols described earlier, the authors in [GF02]
proposed three different tests. These tests perceive security protocols as an implementation of
a general challenge-response protocols. Depending upon the structure of the challenge and the
response messages, an analyzer can choose any combination of these tests to either prove that the
protocol achieves authentication or use them as a heuristic for finding attacks against incorrect
protocols.
In order to translate the authentication tests in the DTPL framework, we need to modify the
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existing framework. In this section, we first state some notions that are either defined in [GF02] or
define the translation of it in the DTPL framework. Later we will use these definitions to construct
higher-level authentication formulas. Moreover, we define some concepts such as life span, a basic
ingredient behind authentication tests, and give new characteristics to the distributed channel. The
overall idea behind the authentication tests is to trace the originating point of a received message
in order to investigate who could have originated the messages of certain forms.

6.2.1 Message Components
Informally speaking, either the atomic terms or encrypted terms are called components of a message. If an encrypted term contains another encrypted term inside, then the outermost encrypted
term is called component. Let t be a component of a message M, then t @ M 2 , which we represent
by Mt , i.e. t is a subterm of M. Let C Mt = {send(Mt , B0 ), rec(Mt ), spy(Mt )}. At the local configuration ξi of a participant, a component t is new in a message M if t @ M, last(ξi ) = e, α(e) ∈ C Mt ,
and ∀e0 ∈ ξi \e, α(e0 ) < C Mt0 . That is, the participant never communicated a message containing that
component previously.

@A [send(Mt , B0 ) ∨ rec(Mt ) ∨ spy(Mt ) ⇒ H(¬send(Mt0 , B0 ) ∧ ¬rec(Mt0 ) ∧ ¬spy(Mt0 ))]

Note that a component t in a message Mt = abtcd is new even though if a participant communicated
a message {t}K before.
2

@ represents the relation subterm. Roughly speaking, it represents the contents of a term.
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6.2.2 Message Origination
If a participant sends a term N inside a message M, N @ M, such that he never communicated
that term inside any message M 0 in the past then he originates the term in its sending message.
Let CommN = {send(MN0 , B0 ), rec(MN0 ), spy(MN0 )}. At the local configuration ξi of a participant, a
term N originates in a message M if N @ M, last(ξi ) = e, α(e) = send(MN , B0 ), and ∀e0 ∈ ξi \e,
e0 < CommN . That is, the participant never communicated any message containing N previously.
We say the term N originates in the message M at ξA if it satisfies the following condition. We call
it (O1)
µ, ξA

A

send(MN , B0 ) ∧ H(¬send(MN0 , C 0 ) ∧ ¬rec(MN0 ) ∧ ¬spy(MN0 ))

6.2.3 Life Span
A portion of the local life-cycle of a participant is called its life span represented by hEv0 , →0 i,
Ev0 ⊂ Evi , →0 ⊂→i such that Ev0 is backward closed under local causality →0+ until we reach an
event e. That is, if e0 = last(ξi ), e0 ∈ Ev0 and e00 →0+ e0 , then e00 ∈ Ev0 until we encounter an event
e ∈ Ev0 . We also represent life span as e ,→ e0 where e and e0 ∈ Ev0 are the first and the last events
in the life span of a participant.

6.2.4

Path

Since upon receiving a message, the SSM identifies a unique participant sending that message
whereas we find some amount of indetermination in the DTPL models. In the DTPL, many choices
exist when tracing back the origin of a received message. Therefore, in order to derive the DTPL
equivalent of the SSM inter-strand communication construct →, we need to modify the channel.
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We constrain the DTPL channel by modifying it as follows:
(C10 ) @Ch [in(M, A0 ) ⇒ B : send(M, A0 )],
(P30 ) @A [rec(M) ⇒ Ch : out(M, A0 )],
(P40 ) @A [spy(M) ⇒ Ch : (leak ∧ P in(M, B0 ))]

Now we prove the following communication formulas
(C4) @A [rec(M)] ⇒ @B [P send(M, A0 )]
Proof. Its proof is a direct consequence of applying P30 , C2 and C10 .



(C5) @A [spy(M)] ⇒ @B [P send(M, C 0 )]
Proof. Its proof is a direct consequence of applying P40 and C10 .



Notice that given a message is received by a participant, C4 and C5 essentially provide a
shortcut by not considering the details of the communication through channel.
The life span of a participant in DTPL can emulate the arrow ⇒+ in SSM (see run2str(u) in
[CVB05b], for example) except that for honest participants, the local events corresponding to the
actions nonce(N) and key(K) in DTPL have no explicit role in SSM. Life span together with the
communication formulas C4 and C5 define a path. A path p in a model µ and configuration ξ is
any finite sequence of events and edges e1 7→ e2 7→ · · · 7→ ek such that:
•

Sk

x=1

ex ⊆ ξ

• αi (e1 ) is send(M, A) and α j (ek ) is rec(M 0 ).
• e 7→ e0 means
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– Either life span e ,→ e0 with αi (e) = rec(M) or spy(M) and αi (e0 ) = send(M 0 , A), or
else
– αi (e) = send(M, A) and α j (e0 ) = rec(M) (or spy(M) if e0 , ek ). The participants i and
j are such that the messages in the rec and send actions are compatible and e0 ↓ ⊃ e ↓.
That is, a path starts from a sending event and terminates at the receiving event of an honest
participant. Honesty is due to the assumption that α j (ek ) , spy(M 0 ). It is worth mentioning that
a participant is deemed honest if he plays by the rules of the protocol since nobody knows the
intruder beforehand. If a message destined for participant B is received by B, it can terminate
the path even if B intends to use the message for illegitimate activity in the future. Since some
honest participant has sent the message to B, the latter will be considered legitimate in that activity.
However, even though a spy event can lie within the path, it can not terminate the path. In general,
only either the local sequence of events of a participant, or the common communication event
specified by C4 or C5 constitutes a path. We use |p| to represent the length and l(p) to represent
the last event of a path. For example, in the above path p, |p| = k and l(p) = ek .

6.2.5

Transformed Life

The life span e ,→ e0 of a participant i is called a transformed life for a ∈ A if
• αi (e) = send(M, A) and αi (e0 ) = rec(M 0 ).
• a @ M.
• there is a new component t in M 0 such that a @ t.
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We can formulate the above definition for a model µ and local configuration ξi as follows:

µ, ξi

i

rec(Mt0anew ) ∧ P send(Ma , A)

where Mtn represents a message M with t as its component such that a term n is a subterm of t.
Moreover, tnew represents a new component. Since honest participants use the transformed life to
authenticate other participants, no event corresponds to the spy(M) action.

6.2.6 Transforming Life
The life span e ,→ e0 of a participant i is called a transforming life for a ∈ A if
• αi (e) = rec(M) or spy(M) and αi (e0 ) = send(M 0 , A).
• a @ M.
• there is a new component t in M 0 such that a @ t.
For a model µ and local configuration ξi , transforming life satisfies the following:

µ, ξi

i

send(Mt0anew , A) ∧ P (rec(Ma ) ∨ spy(Ma ))

Note that for honest participants, the transforming life can be easily recognized in DTPL as honest principals strictly follow the protocol rules. However, due to the absence of explicit intruder
behavior in DTPL, an illegitimate participant takes part in transforming life only if it can construct an M 0 -producing S -bundle where S is the resource available to the intruder. In other words,
M 0 ∈ synth(analz(S )) [CVB05b]. We will further elaborate this issue in the later part of this
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section. [CVB05b] defines an M-producing S -bundle as follows. A bundle is M-producing if it
contains a node labeled with +M which is not connected via →. An S -bundle is any bundle-like
structure with only intruder strands, but excluding M and K strands, where receiving nodes −M
may not be connected via → provided that M ∈ S where S is a set of messages. So an S -bundle
which is M-producing is called an M-producing S -bundle..

6.2.7 Transformation Path
Let (ei , ti ) be a pair where ei is an event and ti is the component of the message involved in α(ei ).
Then the transformation path is a path in which if (ei , ti ) then (ei+1 , ti ) unless a life span ei ,→ ei+1
occurs in the life-cycle of a participant X and ti+1 is new at ξX . Transformation path does not have
to terminate at this point.
Note that in a transformation path if ti , ti+1 , a @ ti , and a @ ti+1 , then ei ,→ ei+1 is a
transforming life for a.

6.2.8 Finding the Originator of a Message
Given a DTPL model µ and configuration ξ such that e1 ∈ ξ in (e1 , t1 ), α(e1 ) = rec(Mt1 ) and a @ t1 .
Then there is a transformation path p in µ, ξ such that a originates at p1 , l(p) = e1 , t|p| = t1 , and
∀i, a @ ti .
Proof. Let us consider the following transformation path p (indexed in reverse order):

ek+1 7→ ek 7→ · · · 7→ e1
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where each event ei is paired with a component ti in (ei , ti ) such that ∀ j ∈ e j , a @ t j . If a originates
at tk+1 in (ek+1 ,tk+1 ) then p is complete. So suppose that a does not originate at tk+1 .
• If αA (ek+1 ) = rec(M), then using C4, B : send(M, A). Extend p backward to (ek+2 , ck+2 ).
• If αA (ek+1 ) = spy(M), then using C5, B : send(M, C). Extend p backward to (ek+2 , ck+2 ).
• If αA (ek+1 ) = send(M, B), then
– If tk+1 is new, using the definition of origination, there exists ek+2 ,→ ek+1 such that
a @ tk+2 and αA (ek+2 ) = rec(M 0 ) or spy(M 0 ), since a does not originate at tk+1 . Extend
p backward to contain such (ek+2 , tk+2 ).
– If tk+1 is not new, then there exists ek+2 ,→ ek+1 such that αA (ek+2 ) = rec(M 0 ) or spy(M 0 )
and M 0 has a component tk+1 . Extend p backward to contain such (ek+2 , tk+1 ).
Since a distributed life-cycle →∗ defines a partial order of global causality on the set Ev =

S
i∈Id

Evi

of all events, the set Ξ of all global configurations constitutes a lattice, under inclusion, and has ∅
as the minimal element [CVB05a]. Therefore, following the path in the reverse order as described
above, we will reach a point (e j ,t j ) where a originates.

6.2.9



Restricted Intruder

We can put some bounds on the penetrator using the observations made in [CJM98]. These observations show how we can benefit by eliminating redundant operations while constructing new
messages from a set of existing messages. For example, considering freeness assumption on message algebra, decrypting a message {m}K after encrypting m using the key K is deemed redundant.
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Similarly, separating a message m1 m2 after concatenating two messages m1 and m2 is a redundant
operation. In its natural deduction style message derivation, [CJM98] calls it normalized derivation. It is observed that “any derivation tree for a message m using some assumptions can be
transformed into a normalized derivation tree under the same assumptions.” In fact, following the
idea of normalized derivation, [CJM98] puts more restriction on the operations of an intruder by
observing that “no introduction rule appears above an elimination rule in a normalized derivation
tree.” Here, introduction rules are covered by concatenation and encryption operations and elimination rules are covered by separation and decryption operations. The overall idea is simply that
if we remove all the redundant penetrator operations in the construction of a message, then once
a penetrator encrypts or concatenates a message, it can not gain any advantage by decrypting or
separating the message afterwards.
Since all the penetrator operations can be transformed into an equivalent normalized form, we
restrict our attention to only those network models in which all penetrator actions are restricted
to its normalized activity. SSM uses the same idea in its Normal Bundles [GF02]. It simply
asserts that in a bundle with no redundancy, every destructive (decryption or separation strand)
edge precedes every constructive (encryption or concatenation strand) edge.

6.2.10

Honest Transformation

Since DTPL treats an intruder almost the same way as it treats an honest participant, the normal
form for intruder strands in protocol bundles obtained in [GF02] does not have a DTPL counterpart
[CVB05b]. Unlike DTPL, the SSM strictly specifies how an intruder constructs a message. The
DTPL leaves the task up to the analz and synth functions. But we can benefit from the back-and-
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forth translation between the capabilities of an intruder in the DTPL model and that in the SSM
model given in [CVB05b] as follows:
“If S be a set of messages. Then M ∈ synth(analz(S )) if and only if there exists an
M-producing S -bundle.”
If p is a transformation path in which pi represents a pair (ei , ti ) such that
• ∀i, a @ ti .
• p1 and p|p| lie at honest participants.
• t1 , t|p| .
• t1 is of the form {h1 }K1 .
• t1 is not a proper subterm of any honest component.
• K1−1 < KP .
If α is the smallest index such that tα , tα+1 , then pα lies at honest participant and pα ,→ pα+1 is a
transforming life for a.
Proof. (Sketch) If pα lies at an intruder then according to the above conditions, the intruder produces new component tα+1 in a message M from its available resources S using the functions synth
and analz. Note that synth and analz precisely cover the intruder attacks caused by the strands C,
S, E, and D in SSM. The only intruder strand that can produce a new component is either E or D
because C and S simply use previous components and do not introduce new one. Given K1−1 < KP ,
we are left with only E strand to construct M-producing S -bundle. With the help of only E strand,
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suppose a penetrator constructs an M-producing S -bundle such that tα+1 @ M. Now it is easy
to see that no matter how many times the penetrator tries to construct an M-producing S -bundle,
tα @ tα+1 @ tα+2 and so on. So we reach a point where tα is a proper subterm of t|p| resulting
into contradiction. As mentioned above, the restricted class of intruder gets no benefit by using
redundant operations like E-D or C-S which can always be eliminated as shown in [GF02]. In
other words, after using redundancy elimination and applying the freeness assumption on message
algebra, once a penetrator uses a E or C strand, it can not gain any benefit by using D or S strand
afterwards. Therefore, a penetrator can not produce M and pα can not lie at the intruder, but must
lie at a legitimate participant.



Similarly, if p is a transformation path in which pi represents a pair (ei , ti ) such that
• ∀i, a @ ti .
• p1 and p|p| lie at honest participants.
• t1 , t|p| .
• t|p| is of the form {h1 }K1 .
• t|p| is not a proper subterm of any honest component.
• K1−1 < KP .
If α is the largest index such that tα , tα−1 , then pα is honest and pα−1 →+ pα is a transforming life
for a. Its proof is very similar to the previous proof.
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6.2.11

Authentication Tests

In this section, we use the above-mentioned concepts to derive authentication tests in DTPL equivalent to the one established in [GF02] using SSM.

6.2.11.1

Outgoing Test for the DTPL Model Configurations

The life span e0 ,→ e1 of a participant is an outgoing test for a ∈ A in t = {h}K , a @ t if:
• α(e0 ) = send(M, B) and α(e1 ) = rec(M 0 ).
• t is a component of M.
• The term a uniquely originates at e0 in M.
• a does not occur in any component of M other than t.
• The term t is not a proper subterm of a component of any message in the local life-cycle of
an honest participant.
• There is a new component t0 of M 0 such that a @ t0 .
• K −1 < KP .
Let µ be a DTPL model and ξ be a configuration with e1 ∈ ξ, and let e0 ,→ e1 be an outgoing test
for a ∈ A in t, then
• There exist an honest participant i with the life span m ,→ m0 , (m, m0 ∈ ξ), such that αi (m) =
rec(M 00 ) and αi (m0 ) = send(M, C).
• a @ M 00 and t is a component of M 00 .
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ξ
a is a subterm of t = {h}K in M
nonce(a)
send(M, B)
e0
e0

a is a subterm of t0 in M 0
rec(M 0 )
e1
rec(M0 )
e
t00

Honest
rec(M 00 )
Honest
m
a is a subterm of t = {h}K in M 00

send(M, C)
m0
a is a subterm of t00 in M

Figure 6.3: The Outgoing Test
• There is a new component t00 of M such that a @ t00 .
Moreover, if:
• a occurs only in component t00 = {h0 }K 0 of M.
• The term t00 is not a proper subterm of any honest component.
• K 0−1 < KP .
then, there is an event e in the local life-cycle of an honest participant such that α(e) = rec(M0 ) and
t00 is a component of M0 . The distributed life-cycle for the outgoing test at ξ is shown in Fig. 6.3.
Proof. (Sketch) Note that the life span e0 ,→ e1 represents a transformed life for a. We can
benefit from finding the originator of a message presented in Section 6.2.8 in order to trace the
transformation path p such that p in µ, ξ, a originates at p1 , l(p) = e1 , t|p| = t0 , and ∀i, a @ ti . Since
t0 is new in e1 , t , t0 . Moreover, since a does not occur in any component of M other than t = {h}K ,
t1 = t and t1 , t|p| . Using the idea of honest transformation introduced in the previous section,
the smallest index such that tα , tα+1 exists in which pα is honest. Also note that according to the
definition, pα ,→ pα+1 is a transforming life. Therefore, t = t1 = tα is a component of M 00 and
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m = pα . Now we have m0 = pα+1 , αi (m0 ) = send(M, C), t00 is a new component of M, a @ t00 , and
a occurs only in component t00 = {h0 }K 0 of M. Therefore, tα+1 = t00 . Now either t0 = t00 or use the
concept of honest transformation again to reach the conclusion.



Now we represent the outgoing test in terms of a formula in DTPL.
_

@A [rec(Mt0a0new ) ∧ P (send(Mta , B0 ))] ⇒

@B [P (send(Mta00new , C 0 ) ∧ P (rec(Mt00a )))]

B

where B ∈ Princ\{A} and mta represents a message m with t as its component such that a term
a is a subterm of t. Moreover, tnew represents a new component. In the above, ta = {h}K in Mta such
that K −1 < KP and a uniquely originates in Mta . Since a represents a term such as a nonce, the
action nonce(N) combined with the axioms N1 and N2 impose the condition of unique origination
in DTPL. As the general requirements for the authentication test to hold, the term N does not
occur in any component of Mta other than t and the term t is not a proper subterm of any honest
component.
Finally, if a occurs only in the component ta00new in M above, ta00new is not a proper subterm of a
component of any message of an honest participant, and ta00new = {h0 }K 0 such that K 0−1 < KP , then
there exists an honest event rec(M0t00 ) with t00 as a component.

6.2.11.2

Incoming Test for the DTPL Model Configurations

The local life-cycle e0 →+ e1 is an incoming test for a ∈ A in t = {h}K if:
• The term a uniquely originates in M at e0 .
• α(e0 ) = send(M, B) and α(e1 ) = rec(M 0 ).
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• The term t is not a proper subterm of a component of any message in the local life-cycle of
an honest participant.
• t is a new component of M 0 such that a @ t.
• K < KP .
Let µ be a DTPL model and ξ be a configuration with e1 ∈ ξ, and let e0 →+ e1 be an incoming test
for a ∈ A in t, then
• There exist an honest participant i with the life span m ,→ m0 , (m, m0 ∈ ξ), such that αi (m) =
rec(M 00 ) and αi (m0 ) = send(M, C).
• a @ M 00 and t is a new component of M in which a @ t.
Proof. (Sketch) We trace the transformation path p as we did in the outgoing test such that p in
µ, ξ, a originates at p1 = e0 , l(p) = e1 , t|p| = t, and ∀i, a @ ti . Since t is new in e1 , t1 , t|p| .
Using the result of honest transformation, the largest index α such that tα , tα−1 has tα−1 honest
and pα−1 ,→ pα is a transforming life. Therefore, t|p| = t = tα is a component of pα = m0 where
α(m0 ) = send(M, C).



Let µ is a DTPL model of a protocol such that ξ is a configuration of µ equivalent to the bundle
C mentioned in the above incoming test. Then, we can represent the incoming test as shown in
Fig. 6.4.
The following DTPL formula expresses the incoming test.

@A [rec(Mt0anew ) ∧ P (send(Ma , B0 ))] ⇒

_
B
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@B [P (send(Mtanew , C 0 ) ∧ P (rec(Ma00 )))]

ξ
a is a subterm of t in M 0
rec(M 0 )
e1

a is a subterm of M
nonce(a)
send(M, B)
e0
e0

Honest

send(M, C)
m0
a is a subterm of t = {h}K in M

rec(M 00 )
m
a is a subterm of M 00

Figure 6.4: The Incoming Test
Here, B ∈ Princ\{A} and tanew = {h}K such that K < KP and a uniquely originates in Ma . Moreover,
the term t is not a proper subterm of any honest component. As obvious, we can use the nonce N
for the value of a.

6.2.11.3

Unsolicited Test for the DTPL Model Configurations

An event e such that α(e) = rec(M) is an unsolicited test for t = {h}K if for any a in M:
• a @ t and t is a component of M.
• t is not a proper subterm of a component of any message in the local life-cycle of an honest
participant.
• K < KP .
Let µ be a DTPL model and ξ be a configuration with e ∈ ξ such that e is an unsolicited test for
t = {h}K , then there exists an honest participant with event m ∈ ξ, α(m) = send(M 0 , C 0 ) such that t
is a component of M 0 .
Proof. (Sketch) In order to find the originator of message M, we trace the transformation path p
in µ, ξ such that a originates at p1 , l(p) = e, t|p| = t, and ∀i, a @ ti in (ei , ti ). It is easy to see that the
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penetrator can originate a message only by using its send(M, B0 ) action in which the originating
term t @ M can be obtained only by using nonce or key actions or by applying analz and synth
functions on the set of messages available to the penetrator. Obviously nonce or key actions can
not produce an encrypted term t. So we are left with the analz and synth functions in which analz
can not originate a message (see the definition of message origination) whereas synth can originate
a message t only by encrypting a message m with any key available to the penetrator KP . Since
K < KP , using the assumption of free message algebra, the penetrator can not produce t = {h}K .
Moreover, since t is not a proper subterm of any regular component, it is a component of M 0 .



The following DTPL axiomatization captures the unsolicited test.

@A [rec(Mta )] ⇒

_

@B [P send(Mt0a , C 0 )]

B∈Princ\{A}

where, ta = {h}K , K < KP , and t is not a proper subterm of any honest component.

6.3

Verifying Authentication in the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol

We take the Needham-Schroeder public-Key protocol [NS78] as an example to illustrate the difference in the existing DTPL approach with the one presented in this thesis. The famous NeedhamSchroeder public-key protocol is given as follows:
1. A → B : {N1 A}KB
2. B → A : {N1 N2 }KA
3. A → B : {N2 }KB
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6.3.1 Analyzing the Protocol Using Existing DTPL
In order to analyze a protocol, DTPL formalizes it by defining a sequence of actions (send, rec,
nonce, and key) taken by honest participants executing the protocol. A protocol instantiation is a
variable substitution σ defined for participant’s ids, their nonces, and their keys. By instantiating
a participant’s role in a protocol, we get a concrete sequence of actions to be executed by that
participant in a run of the protocol. In this way, we can obtain all possible concrete runs of each
participant involved in any role in a protocol.
Assuming that σ(ai ) = A, σ(a j ) = B0 , σ(ni ) = N1 and σ(n j ) = N2 , if the honest principal A
plays the role of an initiator:
0
runInit
A (A, B , N1 , N2 ) =

hnonce(N1 ).send({N1 A}KB0 , B0 ).rec({N1 N2 }KA ).send({N2 }KB0 , B0 )i
or if A plays as a responder:
0
runResp
A (B , A, N1 , N2 ) =

hrec({N1 B0 }KA ).nonce(N2 ).send({N1 N2 }KB0 , B0 ).rec({N2 }KA )i
All of the runs of principal A as an initiator or a responder can be expressed as
RunsInit
A =

S

RunsResp
=
A

Init
σ∈Inst {runA (A, σ(b), σ(nA ), σ(nb ))}

S

or

Resp
σ∈Inst {runA (σ(b), A, σ(nb ), σ(nA ))}

Finally, all of A’s runs in any role are given as
RunsA = RunsInit
A

S

Resp
Init
RunsResp
A , where no two RunsA can have the same N1 , no two RunsA

can have the same N2 , and N1 of an initiator run must be different from the N2 of any responder
run.
Since models of a protocol are those network models in which honest principals follow the
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protocol rules, A’s sequence of actions can be obtained by an interleaving of prefixes of sequences
in RunsA . To model an intruder (dishonest principal), it has been shown that a single intruder is
enough as it can be used to emulate multiple intruders [CVB05a]. While all honest participants
strictly follow the rules of a protocol, there is, in general, no restriction imposed on an intruder.
He can use any of the above-mentioned actions in any order along with an additional action spy to
attack a protocol. Models of a protocol are obtained by an interleaving of prefixes of sequences of
all the possible concrete runs of honest participants in any role of the protocol.
DTPL defines security properties like secrecy and authentication by the corresponding formula
γ. In order for authentication property to hold for NS public-key protocol, the following formula
should hold for all configurations ξ of the protocol model µ. If A as an initiator authenticates a
(A, B0 , N1 , N2 ):
responder at step 2 of the protocol, then using authInit,Resp,2
A,B

0
@A [roleInit
A (A, B , N1 , N2 )] ⇒ @ B [P0 send({N1 N2 }KA , A)]

where, roleiA (σ) can be obtained by actn ∧ P(actn−1 ∧ P(. . . ∧ P act1 ) . . .) if runiA (σ) is act1 . . . actn .
In the above formula, the protocol step 2 requires that the responder send the message {N1 N2 }KA to
A.
Similarly B acting as a responder authenticates an initiator at step 3 of the protocol, then using
authResp,Init,3
(A0 , B, N1 , N2 ):
B,A

0
@B [roleResp
B (A , B, N1 , N2 )] ⇒ @A [P0 send({N2 }KB , B)]

Here, the protocol step 3 requires that the initiator send the message {N2 }KB to B. An attack on
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a protocol is defined by any protocol model µ and configuration ξ for which the security formula
does not hold, i.e. µ, ξ 1 γ.

6.3.2 Analyzing the Protocol Using DTPL Tests
Now we present how a protocol can be analyzed at a higher level of abstraction using the authentication tests presented in Section 6.2. The principal A’s run as an initiator and B’s as a responder
are given as:
0
runInit
A (A, B , N1 , N2 ) =

hnonce(N1 ).send({N1 A}KB0 , B0 ).rec({N1 N2 }KA ).send({N2 }KB0 , B0 )i
0
runResp
B (A , B, N1 , N2 ) =

hrec({N1 A0 }KB ).nonce(N2 ).send({N1 N2 }KA0 , A0 ).rec({N2 }KB )i
From the honest runs of both participants, it can be easily seen that the life cycle e0 ,→ e1 of A is
an outgoing test for N1 in {N1 A}KB0 such that α(e0 ) = send({N1 A}KB0 , B0 ) and α(e1 ) = rec({N1 N2 }KA ).
Similarly, the portion of the local life-cycle e00 ,→ e10 of B is an outgoing test for N2 in {N1 N2 }KA0
such that α(e00 ) = send({N1 N2 }KA0 , A0 ) and α(e01 ) = rec({N2 }KB ).
Using the outgoing test for the responder:
@B [rec({N2 }KB ) ∧ P (send({N1 N2 }KA0 , A0 ))] ⇒
W
A∈Princ\{B}

@A [P (send(Mt00 , C 0 ) ∧ P (rec(MtN2 )))]
N2

We say that there exist an honest participant A with the life span m ,→ m0 such that αi (m) =
rec(M), {N1 N2 }KA0 is a component of M and m ,→ m0 is a transforming life for Nb . Since the only
honest principal having αi (m) = rec(M) and containing {N1 N2 }KA0 as a component of M is an initia0
0
Init
0
tor with runInit
A (A, C , N1 , N2 ). Therefore, the transforming life m ,→ m lies in runA (A, C , N1 , N2 )
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such that α(m) = rec({N1 N2 }KA0 ) and α(m0 ) = send({N2 }KC0 , C 0 ). Notice that the variable C 0 could
not be instantiated from the message {N1 N2 }KA0 and hence, the outgoing test could not guarantee
that the initiator of the protocol is aware of the corresponding responder B. This was the flaw
discover by Lowe in [Low96]. As suggested by the analysis, Lowe fixed the flaw in the protocol
by including the responder’s id B in the message {N1 N2 }KA0 . The resulting protocol, named the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) protocol is given as:
1. A → B : {N1 A}KB
2. B → A : {N1 N2 B}KA
3. A → B : {N2 }KB
The resulting NSL protocol has been proven secure against attacks by Dolev-Yao intruder using
many other formal methods. As shown in [GF02], we can easily use the outgoing test to establish
that the agreement property between the principals is fully satisfied in NSL. We do not repeat the
analysis, but instead focus on one another issue. While analyzing the NS protocol, it was assumed
that the principals already possessed the correct public-keys of their counterparts. Now we show
that this assumption is not totally true. We demonstrate how the authentication tests can be used
to find another flaw in the key-distribution part of the NS protocol. Below is the key-distribution
portion of the NS protocol suggested in [NS78].
1. A → S : AB
2. S → A : {KB B}KS−1
3. B → S : BA
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4. S → B : {KA A}KS−1
In the above protocol, both principals A and B request the public-key of their counterparts by a
server S . The server provides the required keys after signing it with its private-key KS−1 . Using the
unsolicited test for principal A (the test can be applied on principal B in exactly the same way):

@A [rec(Mta )] ⇒

_

@B [P send(Mt0a , C 0 )]

B∈Princ\{A}

Here, ta = {KB B}KS−1 , KS−1 < KP . Assuming KS−1 to be a safe secret of the server S , it can be easily
seen that B = S . Notice that even though the server S must have generated the reply {KB B}KS−1 , it
can not be guaranteed that this message is freshly generated. We can use the incoming test to find
the missing condition in which this guarantee could be achieved. That is, if A uniquely originates
a term a in its sending message Ma and expects it back in its received message Mt0a . It assures
the freshness of the communicating messages. Since in the above protocol, principal A uses a
non-uniquely originating data AB, the corresponding guarantees of the incoming test can not be
assured. Therefore, this protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack based on reusing old keys. Other
formal methods have also been used to highlight this weakness such as [OC02].
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The correctness of a protocol involves specifying various properties of the protocol and analyzing a
set of known threats under some assumptions. We have presented a proof-based framework for the
verification of security protocols using distributed temporal protocol logic. For this purpose, we
have utilized the framework of SVO, which unifies four of its famous predecessors in a sound way.
We have demonstrated how the similarities between both methods helped us utilize the existing
SVO axioms in DTPL. We have also clarified some of the notions and extended the framework of
SVO in our work. We have categorized authentication protocols as symmetric-key, asymmetrickey and challenge-response protocols. We have formalized the source association axioms of SVO
in terms of these categories. Our work contains the advantages of both, the conciseness of the
proof-based techniques as well as the clear representation of the temporal aspects of a protocol run
of DTPL.
We have taken our formalization for protocol analysis at another level of abstraction. More
specifically, we treat security protocols as a general challenge-response protocols in which each
participant investigates the originator of its received messages by applying some tests. Successful
identification of the originators of a received message guarantees that the critical parameters of the
participants match with each other. This results into agreement between participants of a protocol
that eventually leads towards successful authentication. On the other hand, lack of parameter
matching among the participants of a protocol can be used as a guide towards finding a successful
attack on the protocol.
Our work utilizes the authentication tests of strand spaces and formulates the corresponding
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tests for distributed temporal protocol logic. Thus, we reap the benefits from the advantages of
both formalisms. On one hand, DTPL not only has the power to represent a distributed system
in terms of simple formulas, its capability to clearly represent different temporal activities of an
agent makes it a better choice for our purpose. On the other hand, the existing DTPL framework
provides an environment suitable for model-checking type of approach for the analysis of security
protocols. Instead of examining all the possible attacks by an intruder in a model-checker, our
formulation of authentication tests for DTPL makes it possible to analyze a protocol at a higher
level of abstraction. The comparative analysis of a protocol presented in this thesis reflects the
improvement in the DTPL framework and the corresponding ease with which protocol analysis
can be carried out.
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